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LIST OF PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Chris Cannon, the Office of Congressman Chris Cannon, Chris Cannon 
For Congress, Inc., Cannon Industries, Inc., The CI Group, and Cannon Engineering 
Technologies, Inc. were named as defendants in Ms. Mackey's Amended Complaint. 
However, only Chris Cannon, Chris Cannon for Congress, Inc. and Cannon Industries, 
Inc. were served in the district court action. 
After the district court dismissed Ms. Mackey's Amended Complaint in its 
entirety, she filed a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
54(b), wanting a definitive determination on whether the district court's ruling was final 
with respect to only the three defendants that had been served, or whether it was final as 
to all defendants named in the action. R. 521-23. The memorandum filed in conjunction 
with that motion suggested that Ms. Mackey believed that "[t]echnically, [she] could still 
pursue her claims against the remaining Defendants, even if that required the filing of a 
new complaint." R. 526, n. 1. 
Defendants objected to the motion, arguing that the court's dismissal of the 
action was final as to all named defendants, whether served or not. R. 540-44. The 
district court, in a minute entry dated February 9, 1999, denied Ms. Mackey's motion for 
entry of a final judgment, holding that the order filed on January 11, 1999 would stand as 
the final judgment in this matter. R. 566. 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FORREVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES & RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
in the Court Below 1 
B. Statement of Facts 11 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 28 
ARGUMENT 30 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
MACKEY'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM BECAUSE, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, NONE OF THE STATEMENTS 
SHE CLAIMED CONSTITUTED BREACH OF THE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IN FACT DID SO 30 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT MR. 
CANNON DID NOT BREACH ANY COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 38 
CONCLUSION 43 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Brown v. Moore. 1998 WL 854415 38 
Hackfordv. Babbit. 14 F.3d 1457, 1465 (10th Cir. 1994) 31, 37 
STATE CASES 
Brehanv v. Nordstrom. Inc.. 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991) 38 
Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 30, 38 
Lindv.Lvnch. 665 P.2d 1276,1278 (Utah 1983) 6, 9 
St. Benedict's Dev. Corp. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194. 196 (Utah 199H . . . 31 
Thavne v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994) 6-16, 18 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(j) 1 
Utah Code Annotated section 78-2-2(4) 1 
iv 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78-2-2(4), the Utah Supreme 
Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals by order dated April 28, 1999. 
R. 572. This Court therefore has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court correctly dismiss Ms. Mackey's breach of 
contract claim, finding that the statements she alleged constituted breach of the 
Settlement Agreement at issue, did not do so according to the terms of that Agreement? 
2. Did the district court correctly dismiss Ms. Mackey's claim for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, finding that the facts alleged in the 
Amended Complaint failed to constitute any such breach? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES & RULES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in 
the Court Below, 
The background of this case is certainly its most interesting aspect. It 
involves claims of "consensual contact without sex" between a married man and a co-
worker nineteen years his senior. It involves changes in statements by Ms. Mackey from 
a claim that her involvement with this co-worker was "a little minor something with two 
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consenting adults" to claims that she had been the victim of sexual harassment, and it 
involves a sexual harassment action filed against a sitting U.S. Congressman who 
happened to be a member of the House Judiciary Committee that would soon decide 
whether to impeach the President of the United States on charges of sexual harassment. 
The case presently before the Court, however, is very limited in scope. At issue are nine 
statements allegedly made by Congressman Chris Cannon to three reporters from the 
Tribune newspaper on April 15, 1998. 
At that time, Cannon truthfully stated that neither he, nor any entities with 
which he was associated paid any money to settle sexual harassment charges levied by 
Ms. Mackey. Cannon also allegedly made eight additional comments, five of which 
appeared in the Tribune. R. 293 (Appellant's Addendum B at \ 14); R. 357-58 
(Appellant's Addendum A); T. 113:6-13 (A complete copy of the transcript of the 
hearings held in this matter is attached as Addendum 1). Ms. Mackey claims that these 
comments constituted a material and flagrant breach of the confidentiality clause 
contained in a Settlement Agreement signed February 9, 1998. R. 376. 
Ms. Mackey, formerly a field worker for Congressman Cannon, brought 
charges of sexual harassment against Cannon and various entities with which he was 
associated. The parties settled those harassment charges on April 9, 1998. R. 375 at % 9. 
As part of that settlement, the parties entered a Settlement Agreement, which included a 
confidentiality clause. That confidentiality clause prohibited the parties from disclosing 
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"confidential information," which was defined by the Settlement Agreement as being 
"the factual and legal allegations relating to their claims and disputes arising prior 
to the date of this Settlement Agreement." R. 375 at Tf 10 (emphasis added). The 
Settlement Agreement further set out a series of steps that prescribed what could be said 
with respect to payment of any settlement, and in particular payment by Chris Cannon 
and his associated entities. As detailed below, Mr. Cannon's right to state to the press 
that he had not paid anything to settle Ms. Mackey's claims was dependent upon specific 
media pressure regarding that topic. Id. 
It is undisputed that neither Mr. Cannon nor any of his entities paid any 
amount to settle Ms. Mackey's claims. Mr. Cannon maintains that he was under 
precisely the type of media pressure outlined in the Settlement Agreement as allowing 
him to disclose specifically that neither he nor any of his associated entities paid Ms. 
Mackey anything in settlement of her claims. R. 337,410-11, T. 41:12 - 42:12. Through 
his chief of staff, he had previously made those statements to the press, and an article 
reflecting those facts was published in the Deseret News. R. 363. As the impending 
impeachment of the President drew near, however, interest in Cannon's involvement in 
sexual harassment claims arose among "the national press," as a "Democratic operative" 
from California was alleged to have been attempting to dig up dirt on Judiciary 
Committee members. Cannon's office was contacted by The Hill newspaper, among 
others. R. 337,410-11, T. 41:15-21; R. 205-206 (Transcript 4:4 - 5:2) (Appellant's 
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Addendum D). Mr. Hoole admits that he too had been contacted by The Hill, but he 
declined to return their call. R. 206 (Transcript 5:3-4). 
In any event, in response to this media pressure, Mr. Cannon met with 
reporters from The Salt Lake Tribune, and informed them, consistent with the statements 
that had already been printed in the Deseret News, that neither he nor any of his 
associated entities paid any monies to settle Mackey's sexual harassment case. See 
generally, Appellant's Addendum D, R. 202-218. A Tribune reporter, Dan Harrie, 
immediately phoned Mackey's counsel, Roger Hoole, and told Hoole that Cannon had 
made the foregoing statements. Hoole recorded his conversation with Mr. Harrie, and 
based on the content of that conversation, filed the present suit the following day, 
April 16, 1998. Id.,R. 310 at ^  5. 
The original complaint in this matter contained five causes of action: 
1) interference with contract, 2) invasion of privacy (by means of intrusion upon 
seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, and placing the Plaintiff in a false light), 
3) defamation, 4) infliction of emotional distress, and 5) breach of contract. The 
complaint also alleged a right to recover punitive damages. R. 3-6. 
As noted above, the defendants that had been served in the case1 responded 
with a motion to dismiss, filed May 7, 1998. R. 136-53. Mackey did not respond to the 
1
 For ease of reference the Cannon defendants will be referred to herein simply as 
"Cannon." 
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motion to dismiss, but rather, on or about May 22, 1998, she filed a motion to enlarge 
time in which she would be required to respond to the motion to dismiss. R. 173-79. On 
June 1, 1998, Cannon opposed that request, asserting that Mackey did not need more 
time to determine whether her complaint did or did not state a claim. R. 229-32. Mackey 
then filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, on July 6, 1998. 
R. 288-99. 
On July 10, 1998, Cannon responded that Mackey did not need leave to file 
an amended complaint, since no answer had been filed in the matter, and that 
nevertheless, the proposed amended complaint still failed to state any claim upon which 
relief could be granted. R. 334-42. Cannon therefore requested that the court consider 
his response as a motion to dismiss both the original and amended complaint. R. 335.2 
Ms. Mackey also filed numerous discovery motions during this period of 
time seeking, among other things, to take Mr. Cannon's deposition, to take the 
depositions of various Tribune reporters, and to obtain a copy of the tape of Cannon's 
interview with the Tribune reporters. See generally, R. 10-69; 168-228; 302-07. 
Various memoranda were filed by Cannon and the Tribune opposing these motions, 
arguing that until the district court ruled on the motion to dismiss, and thus the adequacy 
2
 The amended complaint dropped the claim for interference with a contract, and 
added the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
R. 295. 
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of the complaint in stating a claim, discovery would be inappropriate. R. 70-135; 
154-59; 233-85; 343-45. 
The district court held a hearing on Cannon's motion to dismiss, Mackey's 
motion to amend, and the various discovery motions on July 28, 1998. R. 575; T. 2-69. 
First, based on Cannon's lack of objection to the motion to amend, the district court 
granted the motion. R. 575; T. 4:16-17. Cannon then argued that the motion to dismiss 
should be granted by default because Ms. Mackey failed to respond to it. T. 5:7 - 6:11. 
Cannon also argued the merits of the motion to dismiss on all causes of action. T. 6:12 -
19:7. Ms. Mackey's counsel argued against the motion to dismiss, and further requested 
additional time to brief her claims of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. T. 44:16-18. 
Because the district court had accepted Ms. Mackey's amended complaint, 
it treated the motion to dismiss as going to the amended complaint. T. 66:21 - 67:2. 
Moreover, the court considered extrinsic evidence submitted by the parties, including the 
transcript of Mr. Hoole's conversation with Mr. Harrie. As such, the motion to dismiss 
was effectively converted to a motion for summary judgment. See Lind v. Lynch, 665 
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1983), and Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 
(Utah 1994). The court granted Cannon's motion with respect to the claims of 
defamation and invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress and the claim for 
punitive damages. T. 67:8-13. The court, at that time, denied the motion on the breach 
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of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, and allowed 
Ms. Mackey additional time to brief those issues. Id. at 67:13-19. Finally, the court 
withheld ruling on the discovery motions until the briefing on the motion to dismiss was 
completed. Id. at 67:19 - 68:17. 
On August 26, 1998, Ms. Mackey filed her Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss her two remaining claims: breach of contract and breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. R. 384-398. Mackey argued an 
extremely broad interpretation of the confidentiality clause contained in the Settlement 
Agreement. Specifically, she argued that the Settlement Agreement precluded Cannon 
from expressing his "personal views, opinions or conclusions about the factual and 
legal allegations relating to the claims and disputes which existed between [the parties] 
before the Settlement Agreement was signed." R. 389 (emphasis added). She further 
claimed that "[t]he requirement that the Parties maintain in strict confidence all of their 
personal views, opinions or conclusions about the factual and legal allegations relating 
to their claims and disputes [was] absolute." Id. (emphasis added). Finally, she claimed 
that "[b]y expressing his personal views, opinions or conclusions about information 
made confidential by the Settlement Agreement,... Mr. Cannon committed a flagrant 
and material breach of the Settlement Agreement." Id. (emphasis added). 
With respect to breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, Mackey argued that Cannon believed "he is free to say virtually anything he 
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feels is appropriate about the factual and legal allegations relating to the settled claims 
and disputes." R. 394. She then stated "Mr. Cannon therefore claims that he has 
retained discretion to comment as he chooses on the Settlement Agreement and the 
underlying factual and legal disputes." Id. This, according to Mackey, implicates the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because "discretionary power cannot be 
exercised arbitrarily, unreasonably, unfairly or in bad faith." R. 395 (citation omitted). 
Cannon responded to that memorandum on October 8, 1998, arguing that 
the plain language of the Settlement Agreement defined "confidential information" to 
include only "the factual and legal allegations relating to [the Parties'] claims and 
disputes arising prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement," and claiming that none 
of the statements attributed to Cannon fit that definition. R. 402-436. Rather, the 
statements that Mackey apparently found so offensive constituted either Cannon's 
personal opinions of matters arising after the Settlement Agreement was signed, or were 
reiterations of statements that had previously been printed in the press, and thus, could 
not, by definition, be deemed confidential. R. 405-07. 
In other words, Cannon argued that the plain language of the 
confidentiality agreement provided a more narrow definition of what the parties were 
prohibited from talking about. Defense counsel later argued that this was completely 
consistent with the requirement that confidentiality clauses must be strictly construed 
because they constitute restraints on speech, and that this was particularly true in the case 
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of a sitting U.S. Congressman who is covered by the speech and debate clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. T. 92:12-17. She further argued that it was clear the Settlement 
Agreement had not been breached, because the district court sat "in complete ignorance 
of what the factual and legal allegations were that gave rise to this settlement agreement." 
Nobody had a clue what the legal theories or facts were. T. 91:15-25. 
With respect to Mackey's claim of breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, Cannon argued that Mackey was attempting to create a new cause 
of action, which is strictly forbidden under Utah law governing breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, and that she was attempting to bolster this argument by 
attributing arguments and beliefs to Cannon which he had never made and did not hold — 
in particular the statement she made in her brief that Cannon believed he was free to say 
anything he wanted about the Settlement Agreement. R. 409-11. Cannon argued that 
there had been no breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. 
The district court held a hearing on these two remaining causes of action on 
December 10, 1998. T. 70. Again, the court considered extrinsic evidence in ruling on 
the motion, thereby effectively transforming the motion to one for summary judgment 
under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Lindv. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1278 
(Utah 1983), and Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). Five 
days later, on December 15, 1998, the district court issued its ruling in a recorded 
telephone conference in chambers. T. 112:1-3. The court first denied a request Ms. 
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Mackey had filed to open the record to submit the entire Settlement Agreement. T. 
112:23 - 113:5. The court then went through the eight statements Ms. Mackey claims 
constituted breach of the Settlement Agreement in some detail, and held that none of the 
statements constituted breach of the Settlement Agreement as a matter of law. T. 113:6 -
115:20. The court further found that Mr. Cannon's failure to contact Mr. Hoole prior to 
meeting with the Tribune was not a breach of the Settlement Agreement, because Hoole 
had been contacted on this subject previously, and that contact was sufficient. Finally, 
the court found that there had been no breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Id. 
Those findings were finalized in an order dated January 11, 1999. R. 510.3 
The order stated: 
Paragraph 14 of Plaintiff s Amended Complaint includes 
Plaintiffs allegations of the statements by Mr. Cannon that 
Plaintiff claims constituted breaches of the settlement 
agreement. The Court, having considered each allegation, A 
through H, in turn and having compared these allegations to 
the language of the settlement agreement as set forth in 
Paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint, finds that none of 
the alleged statements constitute a breach of the settlement 
agreement. 
The Court further found that Mr. Cannon did not 
breach the settlement agreement by failing to notify Roger 
Hoole prior to speaking to the Salt Lake Tribune since he had 
previously notified Mr. Hoole prior to speaking with the 
3
 The order was delayed because Ms. Mackey objected to the form of the order, 
and all parties filed responses to that objection. R. 462-508. 
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Deseret News. This fact was undisputed by Mr. Hoole in the 
hearing. 
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the 
above referenced matter is dismissed with prejudice. 
R. 510. A copy of the court's order is attached as Addendum 2. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Initial Press Coverage of the Relationship 
Between Crelley Mackey and Chuck Warren 
On June 29, 1997, the Salt Lake Tribune published a story, written by Dan 
Harrie and Laurie Sullivan Maddox, headlined "Can Cannon Cash Fix Staff Problem?" 
R. 348-50. Again, copies of all of the newspaper articles are included in Appellant's 
Addendum A. The article began: "Utah Rep. Chris Cannon is offering to pay $5,000 to 
cover the 'expenses and problems' of a female staffer who had an intimate relationship 
with the congressman's top aide but made no formal claim of sexual harassment." 
R. 348. The article went on to state that Mr. Cannon had "enlisted a former FBI agent to 
investigate the relationship between chief of staff Charles R. Warren and Salt Lake 
County field coordinator Crelley Mackey " Id. 
The article vaguely described the alleged relationship between Mackey and 
Warren. It stated in one place that both Mackey and Warren described their relationship 
as "consensual contact without sex." The article indicated that the relationship had been 
going on for about a year, beginning at Cannon Industries, where Warren and Mackey 
both worked, and continuing through Cannon's congressional campaign and into the 
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period after Cannon was sworn into office. Id. Warren was quoted as having stated that 
"he and Mackey did not sleep together and none of their activity occurred on 
congressional time or at federal expense." He noted that the relationship ended abruptly, 
and is quoted as having said "We both knew it was something wrong. It just stopped. 
We're sick about this." Id. 
In the article, Mackey is noted to be unmarried and 19 years older than 
Warren, and is quoted as having called the relationship "a little minor something with 
two consenting adults." Id. She is further noted to have said that "[t]here was some 
contact,... but she insists she never felt harassed, threatened in her job or victimized." 
Mackey's then attorney, Susan McDonald, is quoted as saying "There definitely was 
sexual harassment." Id. 
This article repeatedly referred to Cannon's offer to "broker a settlement," 
and stated that it was unclear whether any payment would come from Cannon personally, 
from his company, Cannon Industries, or from the U.S. government. R. 348-50. Later 
the article noted that Cannon denied that sexual harassment would be tolerated in his 
workplace, and said that his offer of $5,000 to Mackey was what she asked for to cover 
counseling bills. R. 349. Cannon further indicated in the article that if it was allowed by 
the rules governing the House of Representatives, he would be willing to personally pay 
the $5,000. Cannon denied the payment was hush money. The article concluded by 
stating "[t]his isn't the first time [Cannon] has moved to fix a problem with money." Id. 
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The article went on to describe Warren as very driven and at times hard to 
get along with. However, it quoted Mackey as having stated that "Warren could be a 
jerk, but he also could be sweet. She called him 'a decent guy. He's got a real attitude. 
He's adorable and talented. Mackey said the two were good friends - 'extremely close.'" 
R. 350. 
This article began a series of articles that would be printed in both of 
Utah's daily newspapers about Mackey, Warren and Cannon. The next article, headlined 
"2 Aides Take Time Off While Cannon Reviews 'Improper' Relationship," was 
published in the Deseret News on July 2, 1997. R. 368-69. This article again described 
Mackey and Warren's relationship as "consensual contact without sex," this time as 
described by Cannon's then press secretary, Peter Valcarce. Id. The article reiterated 
that Cannon had hired a former FBI investigator to look into the relationship, and that it 
was undecided whether "that probe will be paid by congressional or other funds." Id. 
The article again stated that Cannon had offered to pay Mackey $5,000, which he did 
"not view either as hush money or a settlement for any potential sexual harassment 
claim." Id. 
Both the Tribune and Deseret News ran articles the next day, July 3, 1997, 
reporting that "Chris Cannon's chief of staff, Charles Warren, resigned Thursday amid 
allegations that he sexually harassed another staffer." R. 351-52; 366. The Deseret 
News article again referred to the relationship as "consensual contact without sex." The 
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article also reported that Mackey's attorney planned to file sexual harassment charges, 
and that Cannon would be named in the complaint "because of his duty to oversee his 
office and employees." R. 366. The article again quoted Cannon's staff as indicating 
that "it is undecided whether congressional funds will help pay for [the FBI] probe," and 
stressing that "no payments have been made and that Cannon [was] working with House 
ethics lawyers to ensure any payments made comply with the law." And, again, Cannon 
is noted to have said that "he felt that an improper but consensual relationship had 
occurred - not sexual harassment - but he tried to broker a deal that included an offer to 
pay $5,000 to Mackey for counseling and other expenses." Id. 
The Tribune article that day, again written by Dan Harrie and Laurie 
Sullivan-Maddox, ran similar material. R. 351-52. The article began "Utah Rep. Chris 
Cannon's chief of staff, Charles R. Warren, resigned Wednesday after acknowledging he 
had an improper sexual relationship with a Cannon staffer who now claims he sexually 
harassed her." R. 351. The article, like the one that ran in the Deseret News, said that 
sexual harassment claims would be filed, and that "Cannon [would] be named because of 
his responsibility to oversee the office " The article further explicitly stated "there 
are no allegations that the congressman personally harassed Mackey." Id. The article 
mentioned again that Cannon had initially offered $5,000 to Ms. Mackey. 
It further stated, "Warren has denied ever harassing Mackey, and Mackey 
previously told the Tribune she was not harassed." Id. It continued, "Both aides 
14 
characterized their relationship as consensual contact without sex. Warren said it was 
mainly necking, while Mackey alternately described it as hugs, a kiss in an elevator, close 
friendship and a few 'pats on the head.'" Id. 
The article further stated that "Cannon stands by his statements last week 
that he believed the relationship between staffers was 'inappropriate' but 
consensual...." R. 351-52. And, once again, the article stated that Cannon, Cannon 
Industries or the government might be involved in paying for the FBI probe that initiated 
this matter. R. 352. An unidentified lawyer was quoted as having suggested that any 
payments would most likely come from Cannon himself. Id. 
The next series of articles ran when Ms. Mackey filed her sexual 
harassment claims. On July 30, 1997, the Tribune noted that Ms. Mackey's present 
counsel, Roger Hoole, had filed sexual harassment complaints against Cannon's 
"congressional office, his venture-capital firm and his 1996 political campaign." 
R. 353-54. The article again specifically stated that "Cannon [was] not personally 
accused of inappropriate behavior. 'But under the law, the responsibility is at the feet of 
the employer because the employer is supposed to take steps to see that this kind of 
conduct does not occur,' Hoole said." Id. Hoole, in this article, is also noted to have 
"stressed that the relationship never was consensual." He described Mackey's then 
employment with the congressman's office as "a roller-coaster ride through hell " Id. 
"She's either the greatest thing since buttered bread or nobody wants to have anything to 
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do with her,' [Hoole] said, referring to office tensions since Mackey's allegations 
publicly surfaced a month ago." Id. The article again referred to Cannon's previous 
offer to pay Mackey $5,000. "As for the $5,000 settlement offer, Hoole said 'that's long 
rejected." 
Cannon's then chief of staff, Steve Taggart, is reported to have said that 
"Hoole 'threw out some numbers' for a financial settlement. 'Frankly, we didn't take 
them too seriously'." 
The next day, July 31, 1997, the Deseret News reported on the sexual 
harassment suit. Like the Tribune article, the Deseret News stated 
Although Hoole would not discuss specifics of the case, he 
said the sexual harassment involves Cannon's former chief of 
staff, Charles R. Warren, who resigned from his post after the 
allegations surfaced in late June. 
The complaints allege Mackey was pressured into a non-
consensual physical relationship and seeks unspecified 
compensation and the assurance that she will not be retaliated 
against at work for filing the complaint, Hoole said. Neither 
Cannon nor Warren are personally named in the 
complaints, Hoole said. 
R. 365 (emphasis added). The report again stated Cannon's belief that "he felt that an 
improper but consensual relationship had occurred - not sexual harassment - but he tried 
to broker a deal that included an offer to pay $5,000 to Mackey for counseling and other 
expenses." Id. 
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The next articles ran, one in each paper, on January 20, 1998, when Ms. 
Mackey was placed on administrative leave. R. 355, 364. The Deseret News article 
again noted that Cannon was only named in his capacity as employer. R. 364. The 
Tribune article similarly addressed that issue again, stating "The complaints filed on 
behalf of Mackey name Cannon because of his responsibility to oversee his employees, 
and not because of any claims of inappropriate sexual behavior on his part." R. 355. 
The Terms of the Settlement Agreement 
The foregoing newspaper accounts leave a plethora of unanswered 
questions. The nature of the "physical non-sexual" contact is unknown. The behavior 
Ms. Mackey now claims constituted sexual harassment is unknown. Mackey's reasons 
for stating that there was no sexual harassment, and then changing that statement are 
unknown. What happened between Mackey and Warren is unknown. While the length 
of the relationship is stated to have been over a year, the frequency of the alleged contact 
is unknown. The reasons Mackey followed Warren to work for Cannon in three different 
jobs, during which time Mackey now claims she was being sexually harassed by Warren, 
is unknown. Whether there was any evidence supporting Mackey's claims is unknown. 
Whether there was any evidence contradicting Mackey's claims is unknown. The 
reasons for Mr. Cannon's repeated statements to the press that he believed the 
relationship was consensual are unknown. How Cannon became aware of the 
relationship in the first place is unknown. The reasons Cannon hired a former FBI agent 
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to investigate the relationship is unknown. The investigator's findings are unknown. 
Mackey's legal theories are unknown. Cannon's legal theories are unknown. The 
amounts (if any), paid Mackey in settlement of her claims is unknown. All that is known 
is information that was set out by the press as outlined above. 
The reason the press does not know more about this relationship is that on 
February 9, 1998, the parties to this action entered an agreement titled "MUTUAL 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND FULL RELEASE." R. 140. That agreement 
identified the parties to it as follows: 
This Settlement Agreement is made by and between Crelley 
Mackey ("Ms. Mackey"), and the Office of Congressman 
Chris Cannon ("Employing Office"), Cannon Industries, 
Chris Cannon, The CI Group, Cannon Industries, Inc., 
Cannon Engineering Technologies, Inc., and any and all 
other affiliated Cannon Entities (collectively the "Cannon 
Entities"), Chris Cannon for Congress, Inc. (the "Campaign") 
and Charles R. Warren ("Mr. Warren"). 
Id. The controlling language of the Settlement Agreement reads as follows: 
The Parties agree that the factual and legal allegations 
relating to their claims and disputes arising prior to the 
date of this Settlement Agreement shall be confidential 
and that they shall not disclose to any third party that 
confidential information, the terms of the settlement or 
the amount of the payments made under the Settlement 
Agreement, except (a) to their attorneys, therapists, tax 
advisors or their ecclesiastical leaders, or as required by 
law; . . . (c) to disclose on Monday, February 9, 1998 that 
"Ms. Mackey's claims against the Employing Office, the 
Cannon Entities, the Campaign and Mr. Warren have been 
resolved to the Parties' satisfaction; (d) thereafter, if 
pressured by the media, to disclose (after first having spoken 
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with Roger H. Hoole), that "Ms. Mackey's claims against the 
Employing Office, the Cannon Entities, the Campaign and 
Mr. Warren have been resolved to the Parties satisfaction by 
settlement without any admission of liability, or payment of 
monies from Chris Cannon or the use of tax dollars, and that 
Ms. Mackey has voluntarily resigned her position as Field 
Coordinator in the Provo Office of Chris Cannon in order to 
accept employment with the Utah Legislature effective 
February 1, 1998"; and (e) thereafter, if further pressured by 
the media and asked specifically whether Cannon entities or 
individuals contributed money to the settlement, Mr. Cannon 
or his representative may respond (after first having spoken 
with Roger H. Hoole) that "no Cannon entities or campaign 
contributed to any settlement." Other than as specifically 
allowed herein, the Parties and their attorneys shall not 
volunteer any confidential information, and in response to 
any request for information by any person or entity shall say 
only "no comment." 
R. 146-47; 375 at ^ 10 (Settlement Agreement at ^ 6)(emphasis added). 
Subsequent Press Releases and Articles 
Settlement of Mackey's sexual harassment charges led to additional media 
attention, and resulted in more news articles. The Tribune ran an article on 
February 10, 1998, noting that Mackey's claims had been settled, "with the undisclosed 
settlement averting a threatened lawsuit." R. 356 (See Appellant's Addendum A). The 
article reiterated that "Mackey filed sexual harassment claims in July, alleging she was 
pressured into an unwanted physical relationship with former Cannon staff chief Charles 
R. Warren." It continued, "Warren resigned July 2, shortly after published reports about 
his relationship with Mackey. Cannon had arranged the hiring of a retired FBI agent to 
conduct a private investigation and subsequently offered to pay Mackey $5,000 — an 
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offer she refused." Id. And, once again, the article stated that "Cannon was not 
personally accused of any improper behavior. However, Mackey's attorney, Roger 
Hoole, had claimed that as the employer Cannon had responsibility for the actions of his 
managers." Id. 
The article further stated again that Mackey and Warren had worked for 
Cannon in three separate capacities - "at his Salt Lake City-based investment firm, his 
successful campaign and in the congressional office." Finally, the article stated that 
"[t]he settlement included confidentiality terms[,]" and that Cannon's office and Mr. 
Hoole "confined their comments to a single agreed-to written sentence: 'Ms. Mackey's 
claims against the employing [congressional] office, the Cannon entities [Cannon's 
venture-capital firm, Cannon Industries], the campaign and Mr. Warren have been 
resolved to the parties' satisfaction.'" Id. 
The next day, February 11, 1998, the Deseret News ran a more detailed 
article. The article repeated that Warren had described his relationship with Mackey as 
"'consensual physical contact without sex,' but which Mackey said in claims was 
unwanted sexual harassment." R. 363. It further reiterated the fact that "[t]he 
relationship [between Mackey and Warren] began when both worked for Cannon's 
venture capital firm, Cannon Industries, and continued as they worked on Cannon's 1996 
campaign and later in his congressional office." Id. This article again mentioned that 
Cannon "had hired a former FBI agent to investigate the[] relationship," and that Cannon 
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had initially been willing "to pay $5,000 to Mackey for counseling and other expenses." 
The article further noted that Cannon's then chief of staff, Steve Taggart, "said Cannon 
did not pay any money personally to Mackey as part of the final settlement." Id. 
"He said the settlement was reached 'without any admission of liability or 
payment of monies from Chris Cannon or the use of tax dollars.'" Id. He further said 
"terms of the settlement did not allow him to offer any further details, and other 
comments were limited to one sentence released jointly by Cannon and Mackey's 
attorney." Id. Mr. Hoole acknowledged that Taggart contacted him before making this 
comment to the Deseret News. T. 29:10 - 30:1. 
Ms. Mackey's brief states that "[t]here is no evidence in the Record that 
Mr. Cannon felt compelled to release, or did in fact release, a further statement to the 
press in conformity with exception (e) [of the Settlement Agreement]. Brief of Appellant 
at p. 7, Tf 10. The Court will recall that this is the exception that allows Cannon to state, 
"if further pressured by the media and asked specifically whether the Cannon Entities or 
individuals contributed money to the settlement, Mr. Cannon . . . may respond (after 
having spoken with Roger H. Hoole) that 'no Cannon entities or campaign contributed to 
any settlement.'" R. 146-47; 375 at^j 10. 
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The Phone Conversation Between Roger Hoole and Dan Harrie 
At paragraph 22 of Mackey's brief, she quotes, quite selectively, from the 
phone conversation Mr. Hoole had with reporter Dan Harrie "on April 15th, at 2:19 p.m." 
Brief of Appellant at pp. 10-12. These selective quotations could suggest, as Mackey's 
brief states, that Mr. Cannon just walked into the Tribune office willy-nilly to disclose 
intimate details of the Mackey/Warren relationship. Examination of the portions of the 
transcript Ms. Mackey failed to provide the Court, however, demonstrates that Cannon 
was under precisely the type of media pressure that brought exception (e) of the 
Settlement Agreement into play, and that any comments he made were either expressly 
authorized under exception (e) or were not disclosures of "confidential information." 
The transcript states as follows: 
MR. HOOLE: Chris Cannon was in your office today? 
MR. HARRIE: He was in our office. So as I said, he's back in the 
district. They're on recess. And so I joined them for, 
you know, just a conversation. And immediately Chris 
wanted to start talking about the Crelley case. 
MR. HOOLE: Really? 
MR. HARRIE: I swear to you, I didn't bring it up. 
MR. HOOLE: Really? 
MR. HARRIE: And what he wanted to get out there is the fact that he, 
through the Congressional office, through the 
campaign, Cannon Industries, has paid no money at all 
in terms of a settlement. 
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MR. HOOLE: And he just volunteered that? 
MR. HARRIE: Oh, absolutely.**4 
MR. HOOLE: You didn't ask him -
MR. HARRIE: I didn't really. 
MR. HOOLE: What was the topic that he was talking about? I mean, 
is that why he came to the Tribune? 
MR. HARRIE: Oh, no. He came to talk with John Helnsen [sic] who 
took over Lori's [sic] beat and has interviewed Chris 
over the phone and dealt with his staff, but he's never 
met him in person. 
So basically to meet, conversation with John and I 
joined them and Judy Fahyse joined the, and honestly, 
I mean, I was in there for a minute and I said hello, 
basically, and introduced myself to one of his aides, 
and he started talking about it and said that, you know, 
that when I had written my last story - and Fm talking 
about the settlement - that it was only part of the story. 
The rest of the story was that no money had 
changed or had gone from Chris in any form or 
fashion, or any of the entities with which he was 
associated, to Crelley; that no benefits had been 
conveyed from Chris or any of his entities to 
Crelley. And, as it turns out, I think that what is 
happening is, and I'm just looking for the story 
myself on the wire, but apparently there's a story 
on the wire from over the weekend about a 
California Democratic party operative who is 
basically trying to dig up dirt on members of the 
judiciary committee. 
4
 Ms. Mackey's recitation of this conversation omits everything between the "**" 
symbols. 
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MR. HOOLE: And Chris Cannon serves on that committee. 
MR.HARRIE: 
MR. HOOLE: 
MR.HARRIE: 
MR. HOOLE: 
MR.HARRIE: 
MR. HOOLE: 
And Chris Cannon serves on that committee. And 
this subject of the Crelley case has come up. And I 
guess they've had some calls in recent days about 
that. As it turns out, I guess the Deseret News had 
a story about the settlement as well. And I didn't 
see it at the time. I was covering the legislature -
Yeah, I don't even remember it. 
I don't either. But apparently it said that no 
money was paid out as part of the settlement. But 
Deseret News is not on Lexis/Nexis, which is what a 
lot of the reporters and others use to get 
information. Apparently there's been something in 
the last few days on The Hill, which is a newspaper 
that covers Capital Hill and -
Yeah. 
And they're getting calls from other reporters too 
in regards to the -
I did get a call from one of the reporters from The 
Hill and I didn't return his call. 
MR.HARRIE: 
MR. HOOLE: 
MR.HARRIE: 
MR. HOOLE: 
So I think what is happening is a little inoculation 
here.** I mean, basically he's telling me this stuff 
and, you know, and went into some detail. And 
basically said, now, I'm not saying that you need to 
run a story on this, in fact, you know, I'd just as soon 
you didn't. But, I mean, obviously he's not telling me 
this stuff on the record so that I don't write his story. 
So now, were you on the record or off the record? 
No. This was all on the record. 
This is no confidential source, nothing like that? 
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MR. HARRIE: 
MR. HOOLE: 
MR. HARRIE: 
MR. HOOLE: 
MR. HARRIE: 
MR. HOOLE: 
MR. HARRIE: 
MR. HOOLE: 
Absolutely not. This is from Chris Cannon. 
Yeah. 
And two other reporters were in there and heard it. 
You know, there's just no question about that. 
Well-
**Let me go on here a little bit. Basically the idea, I 
guess, is that the fellow, this Democratic operative, 
that is looking up the background of some of the 
members of the judiciary, and this issue with 
Crelley and sexual harassment, you know, could 
prove to be somewhat embarrassing because of the 
nature of some of the allegations against the 
President, so, you know, I mean, we talked about it 
for a little, once he started talking about it, of 
course, then I started to ask questions. 
And we came back to it a couple of times. And, you 
know, I asked him some questions - and I'm just 
looking over my notes here - and he said, oh, well, I 
said, you know, in the context of this - okay, 
"You're saying Congressman, that no money was 
transferred?" And I said, "Well, obviously, you 
know, part of the agreement was that Crelley 
would not pursue the complaints against you and 
that she was leaving the office. And that was 
actions on her part that were part of the 
agreement." And I said, "Well, what was it on 
your part?" 
So you just assumed that and stated that to him? 
I said that. 
Okay. 
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MR. HARRIE: And he basically, well, not anything really, that 
there were no payments, no money, no benefits 
conveyed. And I said, "Well, and then there was an 
implication that maybe something was paid in 
settlement by Chuck Warren." 
MR. HOOLE: Who made that implication? I mean did somebody 
infer that or -
MR. HARRIE: Well, I think it was a little of both. You know, we 
talked, he said something to the effect that I'm talking 
about entities that I'm associated with, not any other 
entities. And so and I said something to the effect, I 
asked the question, "Well, so there's no string back 
to you or any of the entities to which you're 
associated that deal with this case? That there was 
a payment in settlement?" And he said, 
"Absolutely not." 
And so John, I think it was John Halpreck [sic] asked 
a question, "Well, are you talking about other entities? 
What are you talking about?" And he said, "Well, of 
course the other entity in this case was Chuck 
Warren." And then I asked him about Chuck and they, 
basically Cannon said, "I haven't seen him but once. 
He resigned and he has an entirely separate attorney. 
We have nothing to do with that." There's no, there's 
basically no involvement of the Congressman or his 
entities as in regards to Chuck Warren. 
Now as the conversation continued then, you know, as 
I said, came back to it a couple of times, the 
conversation was rather broad-ranging, but when I 
came back to it, I said, "Well, so now national press 
are looking into this as a result of this fellow in 
California." And I said "Isn't it going to prove 
somewhat, isn't it going to prove somewhat 
embarrassing to you that there is this 
confidentiality agreement? You're saying that you 
had no, that there was no wrongdoing on your 
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part, Congressman, that you weren't involved in 
this? Well, we've never said that you were being 
personally accused of anything but there was a 
claim of hostile environment."** 
R. 203-209 (Transcript pages 2:18 - 8:7)(emphasis added). 
As noted in the transcript Mr. Hoole recorded, Mr. Cannon, a member of 
the House Judiciary Committee, then posed to impeach President Clinton in part on 
charges of sexual harassment, was receiving national media pressure regarding any 
payments he may have made in a sexual harassment claim in which he was a named 
defendant. In response, he truthfully informed the local newspaper, whose stories are 
carried on-line, and are thus available to the national press, that neither he nor any of the 
entities with which he is associated paid any money in settlement to Ms. Mackey. Id. 
Those statements were repeated in the article run by the Tribune on April 16, 1998. 
R. 200-01 (Appellant's Addendum C). 
Ms. Mackey claims that those statements constitute breach of the 
Settlement Agreement. She further claims that the following eight statements, allegedly 
made by Mr. Cannon to the Tribune reporters on April 15, 1998, constitute breach of the 
Settlement Agreement: 
a. That no hostile environment existed in Mr. Cannon's office; 
b. That there was nothing to Ms. Mackey's allegations; 
c. That Ms. Mackey's allegations had no merit; 
d. That her allegations wouldn't have held up; 
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e. That there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's part; 
f. That Crelley Mackey has the ability to waive confidentiality; 
g. That they are not holding her to confidentiality; and 
h. That although she is free to discuss it, there would be no benefit for 
her to talk about it publicly. 
R. 376; Brief of Appellant at pp. 8-9. These are all of the allegations upon which Ms. 
Mackey bases her claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, and these are the allegations the district court found did not constitute a 
breach of the Settlement Agreement. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ms. Mackey is angry because Congressman Cannon truthfully informed the 
Tribune that neither he nor any of his associated entities paid her a nickel to settle her 
sexual harassment claims. It has never been clear why Mackey finds this statement so 
upsetting. Nevertheless, her claim that this disclosure violated the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement prevails only if the Court accepts an unreasonably narrow view of 
the plain language of the Settlement Agreement and simultaneously ignores (as Ms. 
Mackey did in her brief) the media pressure that Mr. Cannon faced at the time he made 
the disclosure. 
Ms. Mackey then claims that at the time Cannon met with reporters from 
the Tribune, he made eight additional statements that constituted breach of the Settlement 
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Agreement. In order to constitute such a breach, however, the district court had to find 
that Cannon "disclose[d] to a[] third party . . . confidential information, the terms of the 
settlement or the amount of the payments made under the Settlement Agreement... ." 
R. 146-47; 375 at ^ f 10. "Confidential information," is specifically defined by the 
Settlement Agreement as "the factual and legal allegations relating to [the Parties'] 
claims and disputes arising prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement." Reading the 
foregoing plain language of the Settlement Agreement, the district court correctly 
concluded that Cannon did not disclose to any third party any of the items prohibited by 
the Settlement Agreement. The facts mandate the same result in this Court. 
Mackey's claim that Cannon breached the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing by vitiating "the agreed-upon common purpose of the confidentiality 
clause and Ms. Mackey's justified expectations" is unfair, because this Court, like the 
district court, sits in complete ignorance of what the "factual and legal allegations 
relating to [the Parties'] claims and disputes arising prior to the date of this Settlement 
Agreement" were. If those facts were before the Court, it would be obvious that "the 
agreed-upon common purpose of the confidentiality clause" had absolutely nothing to do 
with "revelations" of the types of statements Mackey now claims were so damaging to 
her. 
In any event, it is plain under Utah law that the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing cannot be employed to establish new, independent contractual 
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rights or duties. Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Though Ms. Mackey vehemently denies that this is what she is attempting to do, it is, in 
fact, precisely what she is attempting to do. She has no contractual right to recovery 
under the Settlement Agreement, and thus, she is trying to establish that right under the 
implied covenant. The law does not allow her to do so, and the facts of this case do not 
allow her to do so. The district court's decision on this claim should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED MACKEY'S 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM BECAUSE, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, NONE OF THE STATEMENTS SHE CLAIMED 
CONSTITUTED BREACH OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
IN FACT DID SO. 
As noted above, the plain terms of the Settlement Agreement prohibit the 
disclosure "to any third party" of three very explicit things: 1) "confidential information," 
which is defined in the Settlement Agreement as "the factual and legal allegations 
relating to [the Parties'] claims and disputes arising prior to the date of th[e] 
Settlement Agreement[;]" 2) "the terms of the settlement^]" and 3) "the amount of the 
payments made under the Settlement Agreement... ." R. 146-47; 375 at ^  10 (emphasis 
added). Cannon submits that the Court can rule on Mackey's breach of contract claim by 
asking whether the Court presently knows any of these three things. It does not. Neither 
does anyone else as a result of the comments Mr. Cannon made to the Tribune. 
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Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, claims must be 
dismissed when, taking all factual allegations as true, the plaintiff is still not entitled to 
any relief. See St. Benedict's Dev. Corp. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 
(Utah 1991). Moreover, "the burden [is] with the plaintiff to assert facts sufficient to 
support [her] claim [s,] . . . " and the court is not "bound by conclusory allegations, 
unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions." Hackfordv. Babbit, 14 F.3d 1457, 1465 
(10th Cir. 1994)(interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6))(emphasis added). Under Rule 56, 
a party is entitled to summary dismissal of an action if there are no genuine issues of fact 
in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under these 
plain statements of prevailing Utah law, Ms. Mackey's claims fail. 
Mackey claims that in the interview with the Tribune, Cannon made the 
following "unwarranted statements and allegations . . . all in violation of the confidential 
Settlement Agreement:" 
a. That no hostile environment existed in Mr. Cannon's office; 
b. That there was nothing to Ms. Mackey's allegations; 
c. That Ms. Mackey's allegations had no merit; 
d. That her allegations wouldn't have held up; 
e. That there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's part; 
f. That Crelley Mackey has the ability to waive confidentiality; 
g. That they are not holding her to confidentiality; and 
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h. That although she is free to discuss it, there would be no benefit for 
her to talk about it publicly. 
Brief of Appellant at 8-9, citing R. at 376 and Appellant's Addendum B at ^ J14. As 
noted, to constitute a violation of the Settlement Agreement, the Court must find that 
these statements were either "confidential information" as defined by the Agreement, 
terms of the settlement, or the amount of the settlement. Plainly, they are not. Rather, as 
Cannon argued in the district court, these statements are all either expressions of Mr. 
Cannon's opinion, or they are statements that had been made public on numerous 
occasions prior to entry of the Settlement Agreement, and thus, could not, by definition, 
be deemed confidential. 
Mackey argues that the Settlement Agreement did not allow Mr. Cannon to 
express his views and opinions. It is critical to note, however, that nowhere in the 
language of the Settlement Agreement does it prohibit Mr. Cannon from expressing 
those views and opinions (which are completely consistent with numerous press 
statements made by Cannon prior to entry of the Settlement Agreement). Cannon was 
precluded, quite explicitly, from making statements regarding "the factual and legal 
allegations relating to [the Parties'] claims and disputes arising prior to the date of th[e] 
Settlement Agreement...." That is all. While Ms. Mackey would like to interpret the 
Settlement Agreement in the broadest possible sense to suggest that it precludes Mr. 
Cannon from saying anything, it is clear that the language of the Agreement provides no 
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such thing. Moreover, certainly, agreements limiting speech must be interpreted strictly, 
or the most basic principle of freedom of speech would be thwarted. There has been no 
breach of contract. 
Examination of each of the eight allegedly offensive statements makes that 
clear: 
a. "That no hostile environment existed in Mr. Cannon's office." This 
statement is obviously Mr. Cannon's opinion. Critically, it is also in keeping with Ms. 
Mackey's initial statements made to, and reported by the Tribune on June 29, 1997, in 
which she stated that the relationship which formed the basis of her claims was "a little 
minor something with two consenting adults," and in which she specifically claimed that 
"she never felt harassed, threatened in her job or victimized." In addition, in the articles 
that ran in the Tribune and the Deseret News prior to the signing of the Settlement 
Agreement, Cannon stated no less than four times that he believed the relationship 
between Mackey and Warren was consensual. R. 368-69; R. 366; R. 351-52; and R. 365. 
Those statements are in complete conformity with Cannon's opinion that there was no 
hostile environment in his office. 
b. "That there was nothing to Ms. Mackey's allegations." Again, this 
is an expression of Mr. Cannon's opinion, which does nothing to reveal the "legal or 
factual allegations relating to [the Parties'] claims and disputes," the amount of the 
settlement, or the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 
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c. "That Ms. Mackey's allegations had no merit." Again, this is an 
expression of Mr. Cannon's opinion, which does not reveal the "legal or factual 
allegations relating to [the Parties'] claims and disputes," the amount of the settlement, or 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 
d. "That her allegations wouldn't have held up." Again, this is an 
expression of Mr. Cannon's opinion, which does not reveal the "legal or factual 
allegations relating to [the Parties'] claims and disputes," the amount of the settlement, or 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 
It is important to note that of the four statements set out above, only the 
first, "that there was no hostile environment in Cannon's office" was repeated in the 
article printed in the Tribune. See R. 200-201 (Appellant's Addendum C). The district 
court's ruling noted that the other three were never printed in the press. T. 114:15-20. 
e. "That there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's part." Cannon is 
amazed that Ms. Mackey alleges that this statement is somehow a violation of the 
Settlement Agreement. In the first place, this statement had been repeated at least six 
times in the statewide press articles that ran both before and after the Settlement 
Agreement was signed.5 It is absurd for Mackey to now argue that information that had 
5
 On July 30, 1997, the Tribune reported "Cannon is not personally accused of 
inappropriate behavior." R. 353-54. On January 20, 1998, the Tribune reported "The 
complaints filed on behalf of Mackey name Cannon because of his responsibility to 
oversee his employees, and not because of any claims of inappropriate sexual behavior 
on his part." R. 355. The Deseret News article that ran the same day similarly noted that 
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been distributed literally worldwide (through Lexis/Nexis) could somehow be 
transformed to "confidential information" through contractual decree. 
f. "That Crelley Mackey has the ability to waive confidentiality." First 
of all, this statement again constitutes Mr. Cannon's opinion on whether he would hold 
Mackey to the terms of the confidentiality provision. He stated that he would not. More 
critically, however, this statement deals with matters arising after the date the Settlement 
Agreement was entered. As such, it is not a disclosure of confidential information, and 
cannot be a violation of the Settlement Agreement. 
g. "That they are not holding her to confidentiality." Like the 
foregoing statement, this again constitutes Mr. Cannon's opinion regarding matters 
arising after the date the Settlement Agreement was entered. 
h. "That although she is free to discuss it, there would be no benefit for 
her to talk about it publicly." Again, this is Cannon's opinion regarding matters arising 
after the Settlement Agreement was entered. 
The district court's ruling on these statements is succinct and correct. The 
court held: 
Cannon was only named in his capacity as employer. R. 364. On February 10, 1998, the 
Tribune reported again, "Cannon was not personally accused of any improper behavior," 
and significantly, therein, Mr. Hoole is quoted as saying that "as the employer, Cannon 
had responsibility for the actions of his managers." R. 356. On April 16, 1998, the 
Tribune again reported "Cannon was not personally accused of wrongdoing." R. 201. 
The identical statement was run by the Tribune on April 17, 1998. R. 360. 
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[Y]es, he did say that Crelley Mackey has the ability to waive 
confidentiality and that they are not holding her to it. 
However, I do not think that this amounts to a breach 
of the settlement agreement. I think he merely stated a fact 
that the settlement agreement is confidential [a fact that had 
been printed in the press numerous times], but as far as he's 
concerned, Mrs. Mackey can breach that or say what she 
wants to. I don't think that that amounts to a breach of it. 
And No. C [now numbered "h"] is also very similar to 
that, that she's free to discuss it as she sees fit. And, again, I 
think this goes to the fact that both parties are bound by it but 
that Mr. Cannon, as far as he's concerned, she may discuss it 
as she sees fit. 
T. 113:15-114:3. 
It is simply not true that the statements attributed to Mr. Cannon constituted 
a violation of the Settlement Agreement. Rather, as noted above, they were either 
expressions of Mr. Cannon's opinions, or they were statements that had already been 
printed in the press, and thus could not be deemed confidential. These statements did not 
constitute violations of the Settlement Agreement. 
The only other matter then, is was Mr. Cannon allowed to go to the 
Tribune, and truthfully inform the Tribune of information that had already been printed 
in the Deseret News - that neither he nor any entities associated with him paid Ms. 
Mackey anything in settlement of her claims? As noted above, if one omits the facts that 
Mr. Hoole himself generated by taping his phone conversation with Mr. Harrie, perhaps 
one could conclude that Mr. Cannon was not under the media pressure and the specific 
36 
type of questioning that would lead to exception "e" set out in the Agreement. The Court 
may recall that exception "e" reads: 
thereafter, if further pressured by the media and asked 
specifically whether Cannon entities or individuals 
contributed money to the settlement, Mr. Cannon or his 
representative may respond (after having first spoken with 
Roger H. Hoole) that 'no Cannon entities or campaign 
contributed to any settlement.'" 
R. 408 (emphasis added). As set out above, Mr. Cannon was facing intense media 
pressure, as a member of the House Judiciary Committee posed to impeach the President 
of the United States on sexual harassment charges. Ms. Mackey attempts to hide those 
facts from the Court, but they are explicitly set out in the conversation between Mr. 
Hoole and Mr. Harrie, as noted above. Mr. Harrie informed Mr. Hoole that "a California 
Democratic party operative [was] basically trying to dig up dirt on members of the 
judiciary committee[,]" Cannon's office had been getting calls from reporters from The 
Hill newspaper and from other reporters, and the "national press [was] looking into this 
as a result of this fellow in California." R. 205-206 (Transcript 4:7-9; 4:14; 4:23 - 5:2); 
and R. 208 (Transcript 7:24-25). Harrie also explicitly told Mr. Hoole that he, Mr. 
Harrie, asked him, Mr. Cannon some questions. R. 207, 208 (Transcript 6:8-17; 7:7-11). 
Harrie stated: "You're saying Congressman, that no money was transferred?" Id. 
These facts plainly demonstrate that Mr. Cannon had the necessary pressure 
and the necessary questions to repeat the information that had been printed in the Deseret 
News that he had not paid Ms. Mackey to settle her claims. This was particularly 
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important in light of the fact that virtually every newspaper article that had run early in 
this matter referred to Cannon's attempt to "broker a settlement" by paying Mackey 
$5,000.00. 
Cannon admits that he did not contact Mr. Hoole prior to his meeting with 
the Tribune, Mr. Hoole, at oral argument, however, conceded that he had been contacted 
prior to the Deseret News article, and that the failure to contact him again was nothing 
but a red herring. T. 84:5-22. The district court specifically found that Mr. Hoole 
conceded that this issue was not material. R. 510. (Addendum 2). 
None of Mr. Cannon's comments constituted breach of the Settlement 
Agreement, and thus, the district court correctly dismissed that claim. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT MR. 
CANNON DID NOT BREACH ANY COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING. 
Ms. Mackey pays lip service to the most basic principle governing the law 
of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing: that the covenant cannot be 
construed "to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties." 
Brief of Appellant at 20, quoting Brown v. Moore, 1998 WL 854415 at *4-5, and Heslop 
v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), and Brehany v. Nordstrom, 
Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). In fact, that basic principle disposes of Mackey's 
second cause of action. 
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While she claims that she "has not sought to use the implied covenant of 
good faith to establish new, independent contractual rights or duties," (Brief of Appellant 
at 20), her argument one paragraph before that statement demonstrates that this is 
precisely what she is attempting to do. Mackey states: "The implied covenant is 
particularly pertinent here because of Mr. Cannon's claim that the Agreement does not 
prevent him from expressing his 'opinions' as he did on April 15, 1998." Brief of 
Appellant at 19. As has been argued extensively above, the Settlement Agreement 
prohibits disclosure to third parties of "confidential information," which is explicitly 
defined by the Agreement to be "the factual and legal allegations relating to [the Parties'] 
claims and disputes arising prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement." Nowhere 
does the Settlement Agreement prohibit the expression of opinions that had either already 
been printed in the press, or had to do with matters arising after the Settlement 
Agreement was signed. As such, despite her protests to the contrary, Ms. Mackey indeed 
asks this Court to grant her rights under an implied covenant, which she plainly was not 
entitled to under the contract she signed. She asks the Court, in essence, to rewrite the 
Settlement Agreement to prohibit the expression of opinions that have nothing 
whatsoever to do with the underlying factual and legal allegations of the action that was 
settled. The law of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used 
in that fashion. 
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Mackey alleges that Cannon spoke "in a way that vitiated the agreed-upon 
common purpose of the confidentiality clause and Ms. Mackey's justified expectations." 
Brief of Appellant at 20. The "agreed-upon common purpose of the confidentiality 
clause," however, is clear from the terms of the clause itself- the parties could not and 
would not disclose the factual and legal theories underlying Mackey's claims. Cannon 
readily admits that this purpose was important to the parties, because the facts and the 
nature of the evidence underlying Ms. Mackey's claims could certainly prove to be 
embarrassing for any of the parties. Those facts, however, remain strictly confidential. 
Cannon did not breach "the agreed-upon common purpose of the confidentiality clause." 
Mackey further argues that the district court erred because it is "readily 
apparent" that the following allegations "are factual and legal allegations regarding 
settled, mooted and confidential matters[:]" 1) that no hostile environment existed in 
Cannon's office, 2) that there was nothing to her allegations, 3) that her allegations had 
no merit, and 4) that her allegations would not have held up. Brief of Appellant at 21. 
That determination, however, again goes squarely to the breach of contract claim, as it 
requires nothing but interpretation of the terms of the Settlement Agreement. As noted 
above, the first statement had been repeated in the press many times. The court found 
that none of the remaining statements were even printed in the press (T. 114:14-20), and 
even if they had been, they plainly do not disclose anything confidential. If Ms. Mackey 
genuinely believes that these statements violate the terms of the agreement she signed, 
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Cannon submits that her "justified expectations" in this regard are simply not 
"objectively reasonable." 
Finally, Mackey claims that she ought to prevail on her implied covenant 
claim because Mr. Cannon acted "on an unreasonable interpretation of a contract 
t e rm . . . . " Brief of Appellant at 22. Once again, however, this goes directly to the 
contract claim. If the Court found that Cannon's interpretation of the Settlement 
Agreement was unreasonable, Mackey would prevail on her breach of contract claim, 
and the implied covenant could do nothing but create new rights not granted by the 
contract. Likewise, if Cannon's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement is correct, 
then any alteration of that interpretation under the implied covenant could only be 
creating rights not granted by the contract itself, which is prohibited under Utah law. 
At the district court, Ms. Mackey claimed that Cannon believed he was 
"free to say virtually anything he feels is appropriate about the factual and legal 
allegations relating to the settled claims and disputes " R. 394. Although she is not 
so strident before this Court, the implication is the same. Mr. Cannon fully recognizes 
that the Settlement Agreement entered in this matter precluded, quite explicitly, 
discussion of "the factual and legal allegations relating to [the Parties'] claims and 
disputes arising prior to the date of th[e] Settlement Agreement " Mr. Cannon further 
acknowledges that the Settlement Agreement precluded discussion of "the terms of the 
settlement or the amount of the payments made under the Agreement, except [as outlined 
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above.]" The comments Cannon made, however, did not encroach on the factual or legal 
allegations of the prior dispute, nor did they disclose terms of, or any amount of 
settlement. 
It is quite critical to note that the Court is not now aware, any more than it 
would have been prior to Mr. Cannon's meeting with the Tribune, of the factual and/or 
legal allegations at issue in the prior case raised by Ms. Mackey. The Court has no idea 
of the amount that was paid in settlement; it only knows that Mr. Cannon and his 
associated entities paid nothing - which it could have discovered through the 
February 11, 1998 article published in the Deseret News. As such, Ms. Mackey's 
invocation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be nothing but an 
attempt to manufacture rights she was not granted by the Settlement Agreement. 
Cannon has not, in any way, acted in bad faith with respect to Ms. Mackey. 
Rather, he has operated in complete conformity with the Settlement Agreement, in a 
manner Ms. Mackey simply does not like. That does not constitute breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Cannon was being pressured by media sources to determine whether he had 
paid any monies in settlement with Ms. Mackey. That information had been printed in 
the Deseret News earlier, but in light of the media pressure, Cannon felt it was necessary 
to reiterate the point. Ms. Mackey was not remotely harmed by the repeat of information 
that was already public information. The only way she could establish a claim is if the 
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implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing granted her rights the Settlement 
Agreement does not. As a matter of law, the implied covenant cannot do so, and the 
district court correctly dismissed this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Congressman Cannon did not breach either the express contract at issue in 
this case or any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing associated with that 
contract. The district court correctly dismissed Mackey's claims, and that dismissal 
should be upheld. 
DATED this 30th day of August, 1999. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Mary Anne Q. Wood 
Sheri A. Mower 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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THE COURT: The matter before the Court is the 
case of Crelley Mackey versus Chris Cannon and others. The 
plaintiff's present and ready to proceed? 
MR. HOOLE: Yes, Your Honor. Roger Hoole and 
Heather Morrison for Ms. Mackey. Ms. Mackey is also 
present today. 
THE COURT: And the defense? 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, Mary Anne Wood on behalf 
of the Cannon entities that have been served. I'll be 
joined momentarily by an associate, Sheri Mower. 
THE COURT: Now, a motion has been filed by the 
Kearns Tribune Corporation — I'll just call it the Salt 
Lake Tribune. Are they going to be present? 
MS. SONNENREICH: Yes, we are, Your Honor. Ifm 
Sharon Sonnenreich, General Counsel to the Salt Lake 
Tribune. And with me is Michael O'Brien, who's from Jones, 
Waldo. 
THE COURT: Now, we have three or four motions. 
Any priority as far as the motions, or do you want me to 
set it? 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, it seems to me it makes 
sense to have our motion to dismiss heard first, because 
everything else would be rendered moot, I think, by that 
motion. 
MR. HOOLE: I would suggest, Your Honor, that the 
motion to amend be heard first. It impacts all of the 
other motions and frames the controversies. 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, we don't object to the 
motion to amend. In fact, we don't think a motion to amend 
is necessary. We've never answered this complaint. The 
rule's quite clear, you can amend one time as a matter of 
right. We pointed that out in our initial motion to 
dismiss, that they were free to amend. So I don't — I 
don't see that there's any controversy with respect to 
whether or not they have a right to amend. 
We have moved to dismiss both with respect to the 
original complaint and with respect to the amended 
complaint. 
THE COURT: Based on that, I would say that your 
motion to amend is granted. 
MR. HOOLE: Thank you, Your Honor. I think the 
next motion, then, would be our motion for an enlargement 
of time in which to respond to the motion to amend — 
excuse me — the motion to dismiss. 
THE COURT: And I would feel that the motion to 
dismiss was filed first on that, and I will allow them to 
argue that. Do you wish to argue your motions for 
enlargement, if you — 
© 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. HOOLE: I would like to argue that, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I mean with their motion, but I 
would allow them to proceed on their motion to dismiss — 
MR. HOOLE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: — first on that matter. 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, the plaintiff in this 
matter initially filed its complaint on April 16th, 1998. 
Our motion to dismiss the original complaint was filed May 
7th, 1998. That motion pointed out that plaintiff's 
complaint failed to state a claim upon which any relief can 
be granted. 
Plaintiff has never filed a responsive motion to 
this motion to dismiss. In fact, all he has done is filed 
a motion for enlargement of time and an amended complaint, 
which we, in our very first pleading in this case, said, 
"If you want to file an amended complaint, go ahead. The 
rules permit you to file an amended complaint one time as a 
matter of right before we've answered the complaint." 
We are now four months past the time when the 
complaint was originally filed, three months from the 
time — excuse me, two months from the time that we filed— 
two and a half months from the time we filed a motion to 
dismiss. And at this point, there has been no response 
filed to that motion to dismiss. And we believe that we 
are entitled to this motion as a matter of default, because 
they have failed to respond, have failed to provide any 
reasons why this complaint should not be granted. 
Their only response seems to be that they need 
time to do discovery to see if they have a cause of action. 
And, Your Honor, we submit that that is not consistent with 
Rule 11, that you have to have at least enough information 
to be able to state a claim in order to file a lawsuit and, 
if you don't, you're not permitted to file a lawsuit that 
doesn't state a claim in order to file discovery to see if 
you might possibly have a claim. 
Thus, we think that this — if the Court chooses 
to reach the merits of a motion to dismiss, which we don't 
think you have to because of the failure to respond, what 
we are dealing with here is a complaint aimlessly wandering 
around looking for a cause of action and a plaintiff who is 
doing the same. 
I think we are dealing with the amended complaint 
at this point, Your Honor, because we — in response to the 
amended complaint, renewed our arguments concerning the 
original complaint. And the amended complaint makes a 
number of material concessions. 
First of all, it concedes, as it had to, that it 
had no claim for tortious interference with contract. It 
then, for the first time, purports to make some allegations 
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of the claims that it says constitute its other — the 
factual support for its other causes of action. And these 
are found in the amended complaint on page 3, where they 
set forth the terms of the alleged contract between the 
parties which we had already conceded and placed in our 
responsive motion. And then on page 4, where they set 
forth the purported representations of Mr. Cannon that they 
say support their causes of action — and this is page 4, 
paragraph 14 — that Crelley Mackey has the ability to 
waive confidentiality, but they are not holding her to the 
confidentiality; that although she is free to discuss it, 
there would be no benefit to her to talk about it publicly; 
that there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's part; that no 
hostile environment existed in Mr. Cannon's office; that 
there was nothing to Ms. Mackey's allegations; that 
Ms. Mackeyfs allegations had no merit; and that her 
allegations wouldn't have held up. 
Now, Your Honor, conceding those facts that those 
statements were made by Mr. Cannon, the complaint still 
fails to state a cause of action. And I'd like to work 
back from the easiest causes of action first. 
First of all, she has alleged defamation. Now, 
defamation has to be pled with particularity. And, 
obviously, the claims for defamation have to be something 
that impugns somebody's reputation. I look at that 
paragraph 14, Your Honor, and I defy anybody to find any 
statement there that is defamatory. But even if it were 
defamatory, it is — they are undeniably true, because 
Mr. Cannon was expressing his opinion. He was willing to 
have Ms. Mackey waive confidentiality if she chose to do so 
and wanted to talk about her allegations. 
Mr. Cannon was not going to hold her to the 
confidentiality agreement, that she was free to discuss it, 
but he didn't believe that there would be a benefit to her 
talking about it publicly. That is indisputably 
Mr. Cannon's opinion and his opinion was that she was free 
to discuss it if she wanted to. There was no impropriety 
on Mr. Cannon's part. Your Honor, that is also 
indisputably true and was already in numerous newspaper 
articles concerning the allegations of Ms. Mackey's 
complaint, that she did not accuse Mr. Cannon of any 
impropriety. There was nothing to Ms. Mackey's 
allegations. Once again, that's not defamatory. But 
Ms. Mackeyfs allegations had no merit. Once again, that 
was Mr. Cannon's opinion and he was free to say it. That 
her allegations wouldn't have held up, once again, 
Mr. Cannon's opinion, and he was free to say it. 
On its face, there is nothing there that could, 
on ciny reasonable or conceivable basis, constitute 
defamation under Utah law. 
Now, let's look at the question of privacy. She 
has also made allegations concerning the disclosure of 
private facts, apparently. And we have set forth in our 
opening memorandum the elements of Utah law to meet that. 
In order to establish a claim for public 
disclosure of private facts, the disclosure of the facts 
must be a public disclosure. We admit this was a public 
disclosure. 
The facts disclosed to the public must be private 
facts not public ones. Your Honor, there is nothing in 
that list on page 14 that was not previously well-
publicized. In fact, Ms. Mackey's own newspaper interviews 
made those facts clearly public. 
A matter made public must be one that would be 
highly offensive and objectionable to the person of 
ordinary sensibilities. That test simply can't be met, 
Your Honor. It is not uncommon for litigants to say that 
they don't think the other side's position had any merit. 
That's not highly objectionable or offensive in our 
society. 
And, finally, the public must have a legitimate 
interest in the information made available. Now, the core 
of the disclosure by Mr. Cannon was that he did not pay any 
money to have Ms. Mackey's lawsuit or claims settled or 
dismissed. There was clearly a public interest in that. 
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In fact, the settlement agreement of the parties permitted 
him to make that disclosure. It was very important for the 
public to understand that no public monies and no monies 
from their congressman were used to settle this lawsuit. 
So the allegations of the amended complaint simply do not 
meet the test of disclosure of private facts. 
The only other privacy claim she makes is false 
light. And to meet the test of false light invasion of 
privacy, you have to give publicity to a matter concerning 
another before the public in a false light. The false 
light in which the other place would be highly offensive to 
a reasonable person and the actor had knowledge or acted in 
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized 
matter and the false light which the other would be placed. 
Your Honor, I have with me a few of the newspaper 
articles, including interviews with Ms. Mackey in which she 
concedes every single one of the points alleged in 
paragraph 14 of her complaint. '"I don't believe there was 
sexual harassment,' said Cannon, who acknowledged he never 
asked for the investigator's conclusions and didn't want to 
know them." That's a prior disclosure of Mr. Cannon's 
opinion. 
Ms. Mackey saying, "'There was some context,' she 
insists, but she never felt harassed, threatened or 
victimized." That's Ms. Mackey's own disclosure of those 
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facts. 
The Deseret News — and that is an article from 
the Salt Lake Tribune of June 29th. The Deseret News 
carried an article prior to this article in the Tribune: 
"If asked, Rep. Chris Cannon is willing to repeat that no 
money was paid to settle a lawsuit by a former aide, who 
claims she was sexually harassed by a co-worker, but 
despite a new lawsuit accusing Cannon of violating the 
confidentiality provisions of the earlier settlement by 
disclosing its terms." 
Deseret News, February 11th, 1998: "Cannon's 
current chief of staff, Steve Taggert, said that Cannon did 
not pay any money personally to Mackey as part of the final 
settlement. He said that the settlement was reached 
without any admission of liability or payment of monies 
from Chris Cannon or the use of tax dollars." 
Your Honor, there cannot be any false light under 
these circumstances when the facts stated by Mr. Cannon in 
the Tribune article were indisputably already public and 
indisputably true. 
Now we get to the emotional distress claim. And 
it's clear that the allegations of the amended complaint do 
not begin to meet the test under Utah law of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. And I'm quoting from the 
Dubois v. Grand Central case, where: "The defendant 
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intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff 
with a purpose of inflicting emotional distress where any 
reasonable person would have knowledge that such would be 
the result, his actions are such a nature as to be 
considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend 
against the generally-accepted standards of decency and 
morality. Liability may be found only in those cases where 
the conduct has been so outrageous in character, so extreme 
in degree as to go beyond the bounds of decency and to be 
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized society." 
Your Honor, the facts of the complaint do not 
rise to that level. Mr. Cannon having an interview with a 
court reporter and disclosing what was indisputably true 
information cannot be intentional infliction of emotional 
distress because it cannot be considered to be outrageous 
and intolerable in a civilized society. 
That, then, brings us to the — to, really, the 
core of the complaint, and that is the question of the 
breach of contract. And in the amended complaint, 
Mr. Cannon sets forth for the first time the provisions of 
the contract that she claims were violated. And that's 
found at page 3, paragraph 10 of the complaint. 
"The parties agree that the factual and legal 
allegations relating to their claims and disputes arising 
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prior to the date of the settlement agreement shall be 
confidential and that they shall not disclose to any third 
party that confidential information." 
The language there, I think, is critical, "The 
parties agree that the factual and legal allegations 
relating to their claims and disputes." 
Your Honor, it would be ironic if I had to 
disclose to Your Honor in this argument the factual and 
legal allegations relating to the claims that arose prior 
to the settlement in order to prove that there was no 
breach of the contract. But let me just turn your 
attention back to paragraph 4 of the amended complaint and 
the allegations set forth in — I mean, in page 4, 
paragraph 14, the allegations set forth there. And, Your 
Honor, I think it is very clear that Mr. Cannon did not 
discuss the factual or legal allegations relating to the 
claims and disputes of the parties arising to the date of 
settlement. 
He did express his own opinions arising after the 
date of settlement concerning whether he was going to hold 
Ms. Mackey to the terms of the confidentiality agreement, 
notifying the press that, in his opinion, she was free to 
discuss it if she wanted to, the fact that there was no 
impropriety on Cannon's part, which is an opinion which was 
expressed in the newspapers prior to the lawsuit, and 
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simply does not constitute a disclosure of the facts and 
the legal claims. 
Now, I can tell Your Honor that there were some 
very, very embarrassing facts in this lawsuit. And if we 
have to go to trial on whether Mr. Cannon's statements were 
a breach of contract, then there will be a disclosure of 
the facts and the claims of the parties. But I don't think 
that's necessary today, because I think it is clear on its 
face, if you hold the language of the settlement agreement 
up against the statements that were allegedly made by 
Mr. Cannon, that there was no breach, because he did not 
disclose any facts and he didn't disclose any legal claims 
in the article. 
Now, that gets down to the question that seems to 
make Ms. Mackey particularly unhappy, and that is the fact 
that Mr. Cannon disclosed that he hadn't paid any money. 
And, Your Honor, once again, I call your attention to the 
February 11th, 1998 newspaper article in the Deseret News 
in which that disclosure had already been made. And that 
disclosure had been made after talking to Mr. Hoole, as the 
settlement agreement required. 
Now, the question really technically gets down to 
the fact of whether the disclosure be made again without 
being told to Mr. Hoole that it was going to be made, 
because Mr. Hoole had no capacity under the terms of the 
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settlement agreement to quarrel with whether or not the 
disclosure was made. And I invite Your Honor to look back 
again to the amended complaint where that language is set 
forth, but the language of the complaint makes it perfectly 
clear that Mr. Cannon is free, after talking to Roger 
Hoole, to disclose that no Cannon entities or campaign 
contributed to the settlement. 
That was information he was free to disclose to 
the public. He was free to disclose it if he had pressure 
from the press. I think it's very interesting that the 
transcript which Mr. Hoole has provided us of his 
conversation with Mr. Harry makes clear that Mr. Cannon was 
getting pressure from the press. 
"Chris Cannon serves on that committee, and this 
subject of the Crelley case has come up, and I guess 
they've had some calls in recent days about that. And, as 
it turns out, I guess the Deseret News had a story about 
the settlement as well, and I didn't see it. I was 
covering the legislature. 
"HARRY — HOOLE: Yeah, I don't even remember. 
"HARRY: I don't either, but apparently it said 
no money was paid out as part of the settlement. The 
Deseret News is not on Lexis Nexus, which is a lot of what 
the reporters and others use to get information. 
Apparently, there's been something in the last few days on 
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Capitol Hill in which a newspaper that covers Capitol 
Hill..." and so forth. 
It's clear that Mr. Cannon made the disclosure a 
second time because of pressure he was receiving. And the 
information he disclosed was indisputably true. 
And returning again to the transcript provided by 
Mr. Hoole on page 7: "Well, I think it's a little bit of 
both. You know, we talked about it. He said something to 
the effect, 'I'm talking about entities I'm associated with 
not other entities.' And so I said something to the 
effect — I asked the question, 'Well, so there's no string 
back to you or any of the entities with which you're 
associated that deal with this case that there was a 
payment and a settlement.'" 
And he said, "Absolutely not." 
That was information that Mr. Cannon, under the 
terms of the settlement agreement, was free to disclose. 
He did not give Mr. Hoole a second phone call. And I would 
submit, Your Honor, in light of the earlier disclosure, at 
most, that is an immaterial breach. 
Now, finally, we have a claim in this lawsuit for 
punitive damages. 
THE COURT: Before you leave that, this 
conversation that he had with Mr. Hoole, now when was that 
supposed to have taken place? 
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MS. WOOD: Mr. Harry called Mr. Hoole after his 
interview with Mr. Cannon to get a comment from Mr. Hoole. 
THE COURT: But you said that Mr. Cannon talked 
to Mr. Hoole. 
MS. WOOD: Mr. Cannon talked to Mr. Harry. And 
Mr. Harry's relating to Mr. Hoole the pressure that 
Mr. Cannon was feeling and the reason for his interview 
with Mr. Harry. 
THE COURT: Oh, Mr. Cannon never talked to 
Mr. Hoole prior to any disclosure? 
MS. WOOD: He did, Your Honor, when the 
disclosure was made to the Deseret News. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. WOOD: Which article was published and which 
I read from — 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. WOOD: — on February 11th, 1998. Mr. Hoole 
was called and notified prior to that interview. He was 
not called and notified prior to the interview with 
Mr. Harry. And I would say, at most, that could be nothing 
more than a material breach, because Mr. Hoole had no right 
to boycott under the plain terms of the agreement; all he 
had was a right to knowledge. And he received that 
knowledge before the interview with the Deseret News. 
Finally, we have a claim for punitive damages 
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1 here, Your Honor, and although Mr. Hoole has not chosen to 
2 put the full settlement agreement into the record, we have 
3 put enough of it in in our motion to dismiss for Your Honor 
4 to see that there was a liquidated damages provision in 
5 this contract which limited damages to $10,000 to the non-
6 j breaching parties. A total of $10,000 to the non-breaching 
7 parties. There could not be any possible claim for 
8 punitive damages here or any other damages except for the 
liquidated damages of $10,000, which would have to be 
shared among all the non-breaching parties, and there were 
about ten parties to this settlement agreement. 
But, Your Honor, we think it is clear that this 
complaint, on its face, has failed to state a claim. There 
was no defamation. Everything that was said was clearly 
true. There couldn't be any false light or disclosure of 
private facts. Everything that Mr. Cannon said was already 
a matter of public knowledge. There could not be any 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. That would 
be such a restraint on the communications in the media. It 
is so common for litigants and others to talk about their 
opinions about the other person's position. Mr. Cannon did 
not disclose any of the underlying facts of this claim of 
Ms. Mackey's, nor any of her theories, nor any of the 
theories of his defenses or the facts that gave rise to his 
defenses, although we will do that, Your Honor, if this 
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case proceeds. 
And, finally, it is clear that he had a right to 
disclose the information he disclosed and that Mr. Hoole 
has not alleged he didn't receive notice of it prior to the 
Deseret News article. 
On that basis, we don't think there's a claim 
here and the lawsuit ought to be dismissed. 
MR. HOOLE: Your Honor, we have quite a 
controversy here. And to hear Counsel explain the case 
makes me pause because it is completely different from how 
I understand it. 
The Court has granted our motion to amend and, 
therefore, all of the allegations in our motion to amend 
are deemed true for purposes of this hearing. 
I do want to state on the record that we have 
filed a motion for an enlargement of time in which to 
respond to the motion to dismiss for the reasons stated in 
that motion to enlarge. And with respect to particularly 
the liquidated damages issue, I believe that we need to 
brief that. I'd also like to brief the issues regarding 
the privacy claim and the intentional infliction claim. 
But I think much of what Ms. Wood has said today 
is mooted by our motion to amend. And let me first 
indicate that with respect to the defamation claim which 
was in the original complaint, that has been dropped. That 
19 
was dropped, although there was an inadvertent reference, 
the word "defamation" appears one time on page 6 of our 
amended complaint. There are no allegations of defamation 
here, Your Honor. And let me explain why there are no 
allegations of defamation and no defamation claim in the 
first — in the amended complaint. 
Your Honor, this entire controversy and dispute 
was settled. By settling it, the parties agreed that they 
would withhold their opinions, that they would not discuss 
it, and that we would not get into the facts, controversies 
and disputes that led to the settlement. We had to drop 
our defamation claim because that would have necessarily 
caused us to get into whether or not the allegations, the 
claims, the defenses, the disputes were true or whether 
they were not true. And that is not the purpose of our 
case, and Counsel's suggestion that all that needs to come 
out in this case is simply an effort, I believe, to 
intimidate my client. I don't think it's appropriate. 
Your Honor, we had no defamation case, and most 
of her argument hinges on that. And I would suggest that 
that's a red herring and we need to look at the other 
claims. 
But let me first start, if I might, with a very 
brief factual chronology, because I think it's important 
for the Court to understand the facts as they relate to the 
20 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
pending motions. And I will be a little bit broad with my 
recitation of the facts, because I don't want to have to go 
over this unnecessarily when we address the other motions 
before the Court today. 
On February 9th, the parties entered into a 
settlement agreement which was confidential. There were 
approximately ten parties to that agreement. Not all of 
the parties were represented. Not all of the parties are 
here today. Some of the parties who were a part of that 
settlement agreement are insistent that it not be breached 
in terms of its confidentiality. 
Mr. Cannon can only speak for himself. If he 
wants to be able to speak about it, that's his decision, 
that is not a decision that is binding on the other 
parties. So when there is a statement that Ms. Mackey can 
freely speak about this, that is completely erroneous. 
There are other parties to this case which will not allow 
that. 
Now, let me read the agreement language that is 
critical here, because I think it is essential that the 
Court understand that we brought this controversy into a 
settlement and agreed that it would be forever resolved. 
It says: "The parties agree that the factual and 
legal allegations relating to their claims and disputes" — 
and disputes — "arising prior to the date of this 
21 
! I settlement agreement shall be confidential and that they 
2 j shall not disclose to any third party that confidential 
3 information, except to their attorneys, therapists, tax 
4 advisers or as required by law, or to disclose on Monday, 
5 February 9, 1998 that Ms. Mackey's claims have been 
resolved to the parties1 satisfaction." 
And thereafter, there was a provision, and it's 
not in my summary here. Thereafter, if there was pressure 
from the media, Mr. Cannon would be free to state that he 
nor any entities associated with him paid any money in 
connection with the settlement. And that was done. They 
called me and that was done in the Deseret News on the 11th 
of February, as Counsel has suggested. 
But the language goes on, and it says: 
"Thereafter, if further pressured by the media and asked 
specifically whether Mr. Cannon, entities" — excuse me, 
"whether the Cannon entities or individuals contributed to 
the settlement, Mr. Cannon or his representatives may 
respond after having spoken with Roger Hoole, that no 
Cannon entities or campaign contribution — no Cannon 
entities or campaign contributed to the settlement." 
And we have no problem with that. The Cannon 
entities and Mr. Cannon did not pay to settle this case. 
That's not the issue here. That's a red herring. That is 
not the whole story, but that's not the issue here. 
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"Other than as specifically allowed here, the 
parties and their attorneys shall not volunteer any 
confidential information And, in response to any request 
for information by any party or entity, shall say only 'No 
comment.1" That was expressly agreed. That was expressly 
agreed. 
And so the parties resolved their dispute; the 
statement to the press was made. I received no further 
call alerting me that there was pressure from the media. 
Rather, on April 15th, as I sat in my office in the 
afternoon, I received a call from Dan Harry at the Salt 
Lake Tribune. And I know Dan and it was not unusual for me 
to receive a call from him. But as soon as I realized that 
he was talking about Chris Cannon and Crelley Mackey, a 
matter that had been resolved and settled and made 
confidential by the parties, in order to protect my client, 
I recorded the conversation and it was transcribed by a 
certified court reporter. And this is a portion, just a 
portion, of what it says. 
"MR. HOOLE: Chris Cannon was in your office 
today? 
"MR. HARRY: He was in our office and, 
immediately, Chris wanted to start talking about the 
Crelley Mackey case. 
"MR. HOOLE: Really? 
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"MR. HARRY: I swear to you, I didn't bring it 
up. 
"MR. HOOLE: Really? 
"MR. HARRY: And what he wanted to get out there 
is the fact that, through the congressional office, through 
the campaign, Cannon Industries has paid no money at all in 
terms of settlement. 
"MR. HOOLE: And he just volunteered that? 
"MR. HARRY: Oh, absolutely. I mean, he's 
telling me this stuff and went into some detail and 
basically said, 'Now, I'm not saying that you need to run a 
story on this. In fact, you know, I'd just as soon you 
didn't.' But I mean, obviously, he's not telling me this 
stuff on the record so that I don't write his story. 
"So, now, were you on the — this is by me: So, 
now, were you on the record or off? 
"MR. HARRY: No. This was all on the record. 
"MR. HOOLE: This is no confidential source, 
nothing like that? 
"MR. HARRY: Absolutely not. This was from Chris 
Cannon. And two other reporters were in there and heard 
it. You know, there's just no question about that. 
"MR. HARRY: Mr. Cannon said that Chris Mackey 
has the ability to waive confidentiality. We're not 
holding her to confidentiality. And he went on to say 
24 
5 
<l | basically, though, that — 
2 I "MR. HOOLE: It sounds like you're looking at 
3 your notes, 
4 J "MR. HARRY: I'm looking at my notes. And, 
actually, we have this on tape as well. 
6 I "MR. HARRY: But, anyway, he said something to 
7 the effect that there was — you know, that Crelley was 
free to discuss it but there would be no benefit in that 
for her to talk about this publicly." 
And I think that's a very critical statement. 
"Crelley was free to discuss it, but there would be no 
benefit in that for her to talk about this publicly." 
I'll come back to that. 
"And I'm going to have to go back to the tape and 
get the exact wording and everything. 
"MR. HOOLE: He's raising a lot of interesting 
questions. 
"MR. HARRY: Yeah. No entity associated with me 
paid a nickel. There wasn't a hostile environment." 
Remember, Your Honor, we resolved all disputes, 
not just factual claims. We resolved all disputes. The 
settlement agreement says claims and disputes were 
resolved. The parties' opinions on this matter were to be 
held confidentially. They weren't to be expressed. That 
was part of our deal. But anyway, he goes on. 
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"There was no impropriety on my part, no hostile 
environment. There was nothing. Nothing came home to 
roost. And, basically, the message was that — I don't 
have it specifically in my notes, but I will soon, that it 
basically — there was nothing to the allegations and that 
they had no merit. They would not have held up." 
"And that's on tape? 
"MR. HARRY: Uh-huh." 
Your Honor, then he wanted a response from me, 
and I couldn't give it because we'd settled the agreement. 
We had agreed to keep our opinions, our claims, our 
disputes confidential. And yet a man, a member of 
Congress, politician, an attorney, a multi-millionaire, 
someone with enormous power, someone who can walk in to the 
Tribune and have three reporters drop everything that 
they're doing and listen to what he says and write his 
story, says these things, and my client, a typical citizen, 
has no recourse. She has nothing she can do, but this 
stuff's printed in the newspaper. 
Your Honor, that's the background of this case. 
The tape goes on. And because I won't respond to Mr. 
Harry's questions, I asked him for a copy of the tape. And 
he indicates that those tapes are frequently destroyed and 
he's not going to be able to provide me one. And it's 
obvious to me that he is going to destroy that tape if I 
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don't get a subpoena issued right away. So the next day, 
on Tuesday morning, we filed suit and subpoenaed the same 
date the tapes and the notes to preserve that evidence. 
Because it was contemporaneous evidence of what was 
actually said and it was not from a confidential source. 
So we are attacked for lack of specificity in our 
first complaint. And we are attacked because we don't get 
into a lot of facts in our first complaint. And the reason 
for that is obvious, Your Honor. We had to urgently file. 
We were under a confidentiality clause. Very little could 
be said in court. But I submit that the amended — that 
the first complaint, as well as the amended complaint are 
well-pleaded and it provides adequate notice to the 
opposing party that we claim breaches. 
Now, the breaches that we talk about have been 
roughly referred to by Counsel. And I submit that they 
are — they are matters — whether or not they are true, 
they are matters which were in dispute and settled. And 
that's the point. And the statements which were made — at 
least some of the statements which were made include that 
Crelley Mackey has the ability to waive confidentiality. 
That is not true. 
That they are not holding her to confidentiality. 
Well, who is they? There are unknown parties to this 
settlement agreement which are holding her to 
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confidentiality. So Mr. Cannon is not in a position to 
state that, without creating great misrepresentations in 
the record. 
That she is free to discuss it but that there 
would be no benefit to her in talking about it publicly. 
That suggests — that suggests so much, that she has been— 
so much wrong that she has been unable to respond to. 
That there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's 
part. Well, that might have been a dispute that was 
resolved, Your Honor. That there was nothing to the 
allegations. And here is an attorney, a politician, a 
congressman rendering a legal opinion in the newspaper as 
to the merits of her claims that were settled, and it is 
outrageous. He knew that that was going to be published. 
He knew that they were going to listen to him. There was 
no call to me so I could say, "Mr. Cannon, you've got to 
remember what you signed. You cannot say any more than 
what is in the quote marks in this settlement agreement. 
That's what we agreed to." 
It's not that I could stop him from saying 
things, but I wanted to have the right — and that's why it 
was built into the settlement agreement, to say, 
"Mrw Cannon, you cannot say more than this." I wanted to 
remind him of that. Because his reputation is no more 
important than my client's. 
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Your Honor, a lot has been said that needs to be 
responded to. And perhaps I should address the specific 
elements of our claims. The first claim in our amended 
complaint is a breach of contract. I'd submit that there 
is, on its face, a clear breach of contract and that the 
breaches are material and that they are injurious to my 
client. The breach of contract claim has to be accepted 
and the allegations have to be accepted as true for 
purposes of a motion to dismiss. 
THE COURT: Tell me more about this conversation 
Mr. Cannon had with you prior to the Deseret News article. 
MR. H00LE: Actually, the conversation was not 
with me and Mr. Cannon, it was with one of his aides. One 
of his aides called me and said that there was pressure and 
that they may go to the press. They didn't tell me that 
they were going to talk to the Deseret News or put an 
article in the Deseret News. I didn't even know it had 
been there. But, basically, this was right after we had 
settled within the context of this progressive disclosure 
that we had agreed to. If the pressure mounted to such a 
point that he had to make a statement, he was free to make 
a statement. And I have no objection, Your Honor. I 
haven't read the Deseret News article, but I have no 
objection to his saying what I believe was probably 
permitted by the settlement agreement in that article. I 
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-I i haven't read the article. 
2 I But what I do have a problem with is this second 
3 disclosure, months later, after this file was collecting 
4 J dust in everybody's office. 
5 , THE COURT: Would the contact that the aide had 
6 I with you be sufficient to meet the criterion of the 
contract months later? 7 
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MR. HOOLE: No. No. The settlement agreement 
required two contacts with me. The first contact, I will 
concede, occurred. I didn't know it was going to result in 
an article in the Deseret News. But that happened. My 
understanding, frankly, is that they weren't going to do 
anything, but they had the right to talk to the Deseret 
News if they felt pressured. 
My concern is the second contact. There was — 
the second incident. They never contacted me and said, "We 
are going to go unannounced to the Tribune, me and some 
staff members. And we are going to give them our story." 
That was — I had no idea that was going to happen. And if 
I had, I would have cautioned them very, very vigorously 
not to violate the settlement agreement. 
Your Honor, these settlement agreements are 
certainly favored by the court, as the Court knows, and the 
confidentiality of these settlement agreements is so 
integral to these things. And what is happening here just 
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1 absolutely violates the whole purpose of settling these 
2 cases. And now we're involved in litigation because one 
3 party — one out of many parties to a settlement 
4 agreement — decides that his reputation is so important 
5 that he can — he can smear others when others have no 
6 ability to respond to those allegations. 
7 THE COURT: You're saying that he had the right 
8 to say what he said if he talked to you ahead of time. 
9 J MR. HOOLE: No, Your Honor, I'm not saying that. 
And I'm glad the Court asked for clarification on that. 
The only thing that he could have said under the terms of 
the settlement agreement is, quote — and let me read it. 
If further — this is after the first disclosure to the 
Deseret News. If further pressured by the media and asked 
specifically whether the Cannon entities or individuals 
contributed money to the settlement, Mr. Cannon or his 
representatives may respond, after having spoken with Roger 
Hoole that, quote, "No Cannon entities or campaign 
contributed to any settlement," close quote. 
That's what he was allowed to say. That's what 
we agreed upon. And thereafter, they are only allowed to 
say, quote, "no comment." And that's our problem. If he 
had said that, that would — we wouldn't be here today. 
But that's not what was said. He went far beyond that and 
flagrantly violated the — the settlement agreement and his 
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conduct constitutes independent tortious conduct. It went 
far beyond a mere breach. 
He states, Your Honor — he states to the 
Tribune — and, of course, we've been prevented from 
confirming any of this. But he states to the Tribune, 
"Crelley was free to discuss it, but there would be no 
benefit in that for her to talk about this publicly." 
Chris Cannon knows Crelley Mackey is prevented 
from talking about this publicly, and then suggests that, 
for some untoward reason, she wouldn't want to talk about 
it anyway. He knows that this is a loaded comment that is 
going to cause her real problems. And it has. And yet he 
says it anyway and then publicizes it like that. 
I submit to you — I submit to the Court that 
that is an egregious act. That is an egregious act which 
offends morality and decency as we know it. Courts favor 
settlement agreements; confidentiality clauses are integral 
parts of settlement agreements. Ms. Mackey has done 
nothing to deserve this. The matter was resolved and she 
is bound. She cannot talk about this. Her only claim is 
to come to this court and seek damages for the injury to 
her reputation, because the parties agreed that the 
disputes between them would not be discussed and that they 
would not express their opinions, let alone to the press. 
So I submit that whatever facts there may have 
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been were made private and that Mr. Cannon's public 
2 I disclosure of those facts, as acknowledged by Counsel, is 
3 actionable and that she has in fact been damaged. 
4 These people were not litigants, as Counsel 
5 suggests, when this disclosure was made. They had resolved 
their dispute. There had never been a case filed. They 
were not litigants. This was not a matter of public 
interest. Not appropriately, anyway. But it was made 
public by Mr. Cannon, and wrongfully so. 
Your Honor, this conduct has — and we haven't 
had an opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss, but 
with respect to the privacy claim, I would submit that the 
Court, having granted our motion to amend, needs to accept 
our allegations as true for purposes of this motion, and 
that there were public disclosures involving private 
information which the public has no legitimate interest in 
knowing and that with respect to the infliction of 
emotional distress claim, that Mr. Cannon acted 
intentionally, or at least with a reckless disregard of 
causing emotional distress to Crelley Mackey, and violating 
all of the notions of fairness and decency and those things 
that our system is based on. 
THE COURT: Did you agree that what he said was 
true? 
MR. HOOLE: Your Honor, I do not agree that it 
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was true, but that suggests that we could go back and 
relitigate the underlying disputes which, by the parties1 
settlement, were resolved. Nobody admitted anything in the 
settlement agreement. We simply agreed — 
THE COURT: Well — 
MR. HOOLE: — that the disputes would be kept 
confidential. 
THE COURT: Let me reword my question. Did you 
admit that what he said was in the settlement agreement? 
MR. HOOLE: I do not admit that. No. He said 
nothing — there's nowhere in the settlement agreement 
where it allows him to make the statements he made. 
THE COURT: No, I didn't say anything about 
allowing him to make them. I'm saying the statements that 
he made were true statements from the settlement agreement. 
MR. HOOLE: I'm sorry, I don't follow the Court. 
THE COURT: Well, the settlement agreement 
contains certain provisions and he stated those provisions. 
So what he stated was contained within the settlement 
agreement? 
MR. HOOLE: What he said to the Tribune was 
outside the settlement agreement, was not permitted by the 
settlement agreement. 
THE COURT: Well, I understand it's permitted — 
1 MR. HOOLE: I must not be following the Court. 
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THE COURT: I must not be saying the question 
correctly. I'm just concerned that the statements which he 
made were — were made from material taken from the 
settlement agreement. 
MR. HOOLE: Oh. I see. No, Your Honor, I don't 
think that they were made — they were — I suppose 
Mr. Cannon has an opinion, and in fact I think he's 
expressed it, and where he got that opinion, I don't know. 
It may have been that those opinions may have been 
reflected in the settlement agreement to the extent that 
that was their defense that they asserted that the parties 
resolved. But the actual allegations in any specificity 
are not expressly in the settlement agreement. I think 
they're just referred to. 
What the settlement agreement does say is that 
all disputes prior to February 9, 1998 between the parties 
are resolved and they're not going to talk about them, and 
nobody admits any responsibility or liability. But the 
matter's resolved and we're simply not going to talk about 
it, other than as narrowly allowed under the 
confidentiality clause. 
So all disputes, all factual disputes, all legal 
claims, all of that, is not properly discussed at this 
point. 
I hope I answered the Court's question. 
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THE COURT: That's fine. 
MR. HOOLE: As alleged in our complaint, 
Ms. Mackey has suffered severe emotional distress and the 
conduct here was, certainly, wilful and malicious and 
manifested in knowing disregard toward her rights. And, 
therefore, she's entitled to present to the jury a claim 
for punitive damages. 
What we have here, Your Honor — this is all 
couched in terms of the motion to dismiss, but we have more 
than a motion to dismiss here. It's really a factual 
dispute. Mr. Cannon, in his motion to dismiss, is very 
definite in stating that — that his only breach is that he 
failed to first speak with Mr. Hoole. That's what he 
claims, 
I submit that taking the allegations in our 
complaint as true and taking the statement from the 
transcribed conversation between me and Mr. Harry as true, 
that Mr. Cannon made a lot more statements, did a lot more 
to violate that settlement agreement than simply fail to 
call me first. 
There's a factual dispute here, and yet this is 
being presented to the Court in the context of a motion to 
dismiss. And, Your Honor, we have tried to conduct 
discovery on this case, and we'll get into this, I'm sure, 
in a minute. But we have been prevented from following 
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1 through on our discovery. We have a factual dispute here 
2 between what the Salt Lake Tribune says and what Mr. Cannon 
3 says, and we need to have that clarified. But because of 
4 the motions that have been filed, not only do we have a 
5 factual dispute that we're entitled to have sorted out, but 
6 J we have a procedural logjam where they are saying, "Dismiss 
our case before we have to submit to a deposition." That's 
Mr. Cannon's position. And the Tribune is saying, "We 
g I don't know yet whether or not we want to claim a privilege, 
because we don't understand your complaints. There's not 
enough facts in it; we haven't been able to make an 
informed decision. And we're going to wait and see if the 
case is dismissed before we do that." 
And that's — that is what's so difficult here, 
Your Honor, is that Ms. Mackey has, in good faith, brought 
this action and has clarified her claims and the facts and 
is entitled to proceed and, yet, is being obstructed by 
these efforts. 
And I submit that we ought to be allowed an 
opportunity, if the Court is inclined to grant the motion 
to dismiss, to brief the motion. Because I think we've 
preserved our claim and our right to do so. But I think 
the amended complaint moots that motion. And the facts in 
the amended complaint, if accepted as true, subject to 
later discovery and bolstering of those facts for trial, 
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1 | which is the appropriate procedure. I submit that, based 
2 I on that, the motion should be denied. 
3 Thank you. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
5 MS. WOOD: May I respond briefly, Your Honor? 
6 Your Honor, if I may approach the bench, I did 
bring copies for the Court as well as for opposing counsel 
the prior newspaper articles about this case, which I think 
the Court can take judicial notice of, and about the 
claims. 
Your Honor, I think it is important to emphasize 
that my comments went totally and completely to the amended 
complaint. And the motion to dismiss was renewed with 
respect to the amended complaint. I don't know how much 
time Mr. Hoole needs to respond to a motion to dismiss, but 
I think — let's see, he filed his complaint in April and 
we're now nearly to August — that that is plenty of time 
to respond to a motion to dismiss. And the plain fact of 
the matter is that he's had an adequate opportunity to 
brief it and that it is indisputable that he's failed to 
state a claim under emotional distress or privacy. 
Now, let's talk about the breach of contract 
claim. And I think it's important to understand that a 
court interprets a contract as a matter of law and that 
Mr. Hoole has set forth, on page 3 of his complaint, the 
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only part of that contract that he's apparently concerned 
about — and I think that that language is very critical 
and I donft like the way he keeps misquoting it. 
"The parties agree that the factual and legal 
allegations relating to their claims and disputes arising 
prior to the date of this settlement agreement shall be 
confidential and not be disclosed to third parties." 
It doesn't say one thing about the parties — 
anything other being confidential other than the factual 
and legal allegations. And I submit, on page 4, the 
statements that Mr. Hoole is so offended by in his 
complaint do not amount to a statement of the factual or 
legal allegations relating to their claims and disputes. 
Nowhere — and if I were to ask the Court this morning or 
anyone sitting in this courtroom what it was that 
Ms. Mackey alleged happened, why it was that Mr. Cannon 
believed it didn't happen, and why there was a defense, 
nobody would have a clue. Mr. Cannon did not discuss the 
factual and legal allegations relating to their claims and 
disputes, which is the only thing he was prohibited from 
talking about. And he was only prohibited from talking 
about those arising prior to the date of the settlement 
agreement. 
Now, Mr. Cannon was free to say anything he 
wanted to arising after his opinions — after the date of 
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the settlement agreement. 
THE COURT: Through the whole settlement 
agreement? 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, I don't think that he 
could disclose the settlement — the terms of the 
settlement agreement, which he did not. I don't think he 
could disclose the factual allegations that gave rise to 
their disputes, which he did not. There is no question, 
nowhere on that list is there any of that. 
The closest it comes to it is that there was no 
hostile environment existing in Mr. Cannon's office. And, 
Your Honor, that was already a matter of public record. 
Mr. Cannon's position on that was very clear. That had 
been in the press repeatedly prior to the time of the 
settlement agreement. And it's absolutely ludicrous to say 
he couldn't say what he had always said, which is that 
there was no hostile environment in his — in his office, 
when that was already a matter of public record. It could 
not, by definition, be confidential. 
And you don't know, nobody sitting here knows, 
none of the reporters know the factual or legal allegations 
that gave rise to the disputes. That's what he was 
prohibited from talking about. 
He was also permitted to disclose that he didn't 
pay any money. And that was a very critical point to him. 
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Now, Your Honor, I found Roger's argument very 
interesting here, because he said he knew there was going 
to be a disclosure; he didn't even pay attention to the 
Deseret News article. That it wasn't Mr. Cannon who called 
him, some aide called him. 
It's very clear — Mr. Hoole can stand up here 
now and say, "I would have cautioned Mr. Cannon." But it's 
very clear that this was a notice-only requirement, and 
that he didn't pay any attention to it. And it appears 
that, as far as Mr. Hoole's concerned, the only disclosures 
that matter, or the only pressures that matter are the ones 
coming from the Tribune. But that's not what the language 
of the agreement says. It says that after Mr. Cannon 
receives pressure and if asked specifically, can state that 
his campaign and his entities didn't pay a dime. And, Your 
Honor, that pressure, as Mr. Hoole concedes in his 
transcript, at page 4, was coming from the Hill. 
Mr. Cannon was a member of the Judiciary Committee. Press 
being supported by the Democrats were looking for skeletons 
in the closet of Republican members of the Judiciary 
Committee. 
And Mr. Cannon was, as the transcript points out, 
feeling pressure and was concerned because the Lexis Nexus 
wasn't carrying the Deseret News article. Under those 
circumstances, he was free to make the disclosure. There's 
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5 
8 
1 nothing in this settlement agreement that says if he's 
2 feeling pressure from the Tribune, he can review — he can 
3 disclose the information from the Tribune. What it says 
4 I is, if he's feeling pressure from the press, he can 
disclose the information. 
Mr. Cannon was indisputably, according to 
7 I Mr. Hoole's own transcript, feeling pressure from the 
press, and he chose to make the disclosure that had already 
g I been made to the Deseret News, to the Salt Lake Tribune, 
rather than making it to the Hill newspapers. There's 
nothing, absolutely nothing, in the settlement agreement 
that precluded him from doing that. 
Now, I am sorry that Ms. Mackey is so offended by 
the fact that Mr. Cannon has no intention of holding her to 
a confidentiality agreement. If other people want to hold 
her to it, it is fine. But all they have alleged here is 
that Mr. Cannon would be willing to waive that and that 
they are not holding him to it. "They," obviously 
Mr. Cannon speaking for himself. 
That he would — that, in his opinion, she's free 
to discuss it, but, in his opinion, there would be no 
benefit for her to talk about it publicly. But there was 
no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's part. That's in all of the 
newspapers. Nobody ever alleged there was any impropriety 
on Mr. Cannon's part. 
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The core of this settlement agreement is clear on 
the face of the language, is that he was not to disclose 
the factual and legal allegations relating to the claims 
and disputes prior to the date of the settlement agreement. 
And that Mr. Cannon, indisputably, never did. It's never 
been alleged. And for that reason, there can be no 
contract claim. 
Your Honor, the emotional distress and the 
privacy claims here are, on their face, ludicrous. There's 
not a single case that would support an emotional distress 
claim in a case like this, or a breach of privacy claim. 
This was not private information; this was information that 
was already in the public domain. There is nothing 
outrageous about it. 
There are lots of Utah case law which we have 
cited, Your Honor, in our briefs dealing with far more 
egregious situations, people being sexually touched, 
propositioned, subjected to all kinds of hostile 
environments. And the court has said it's not sufficient 
to — really outrageous to state emotional distress. 
Those claims, we submit, must be dismissed. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hoole, do you wish to argue your 
motion for enlargement of time or to take a deposition? 
MR. HOOLE: Yes, Your Honor. Let me just address 
the motion for enlargement of time at this point. 
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Counsel's raised issues that I think need to be 
briefed. If the Court is inclined to grant their motion to 
dismiss in any part, I think that we have a dispute here 
regarding what facts and allegations make — may — excuse 
me. I think we have a dispute here regarding what the 
facts and allegations mean. It seems to me very clear that 
Mr. Cannon made allegations in his statements to the 
Tribune. They were defense statements. They were 
allegations that there was no merit to the claims. There 
were allegations that nothing came home to roost, that 
there was nothing improper by his conduct, nothing improper 
in the office. Those are allegations. Those are factual 
claims. He stated that as an attorney, as an — you know, 
within (inaudible). It was — there's no — you know, 
we're playing games with semantics here. 
One of the things I think that we'd like to brief 
is the fact that we have brought a claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. And what 
that covenant says, in a nutshell, is that if there is some 
area in a contract where the parties are not able to 
specifically identify what they mean, then the Court 
applies a reasonableness test. It's a jury question. And 
the benefit of the bargain reached by the parties is 
honored. 
And I submit, Your Honor, that the benefit of the 
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bargain here, for my client, was the ability to have these 
matters resolved and to have no further discussion of it. 
And these prior newspaper articles, inaccurate as they may 
be, have nothing to do with the fact that the parties 
agreed that there would be no further discussion other than 
Mr. Cannon saying what is allowed under the settlement 
agreement — and that's one statement that, "Neither I nor 
my parties paid any money." That's all he was allowed to 
say. 
He went far beyond that and I submit that the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing gives rise 
to a cause of action. It's not a new and independent 
right. It is simply a cause of action that helps the 
Court — helps the parties understand what was really 
bargained for. It shows the materiality of the breach in 
this case, that being that the reasonable expectation — 
reasonably expected benefits of the settlement agreement 
have been violated by this disclosure, this disclosure that 
cannot be responded to, other than through this action for 
damages. 
Thank you. 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, if I may address the 
enlargement of time, we've had a lot of time. This thing 
has been before the Court for a long time and Mr. Hoole has 
had plenty of time to respond. 
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I also — we have breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, and I've taught contracts for 22 
years, and I've never seen it described in the way that 
Mr. Hoole described it. The breach of a covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing under Utah law, and as cited in our 
briefs, gives nothing to the parties but a right to have 
the covenants of the contract performed. And that's very 
clear. It's no independent right. 
And if Mr. Hoole wanted to brief that, he could 
have done that. 
MR. HOOLE: I'd like to brief that, Your Honor, 
with the Court's permission. It is important to my client, 
THE COURT: Now, does this cover your motion to 
take the deposition? 
MR. HOOLE: No, Your Honor. We have not — I 
have not addressed that yet and I'd be happy to. I'd like 
to take just a moment to address that motion, Your Honor. 
Soon after filing this action we, of course, 
subpoenaed the reporter's notes and the reporter's tape of 
Mr. Cannon's conversation. We also noticed Mr. Cannon's 
deposition. And there's been some reference in the record 
that we weren't cordial about how we did that. And I'd 
like to point out that we sent a letter and said, "These 
are the dates we understand Mr. Cannon's going to be 
available. This is the date we have picked. Here is a 
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1 notice. If this date does not work for you or Mr. Cannon, 
2 please let us know and we'll work something out." We 
3 didn't get anything but a motion for protective order in 
4 response to that that mischaracterized what had happened 
5 prior to that time. 
6 We have a factual dispute in this case, and the 
7 factual dispute is between the Tribune, which says, "These 
statements were made to us," and they ran an article 
incorporating some of them, and Mr. Cannon's statement that 
the only breach was his failure to contact me first. 
Well, I submit, Your Honor, that that is an 
enormous factual dispute and that this is more akin to a 
motion for summary judgment, where factual disputes must be 
resolved in favor of the non-movant — in this case, 
Ms. Mackey — than it is a motion to dismiss. 
But, in any event, we have pleaded our claims 
with sufficient particularity to go forward with discovery 
and we're now entitled to depose Mr. Cannon. We will do it 
at a reasonable time. We do not mean to cause him any 
inconvenience. If the Court were to read my letter to 
Counsel, it would be obvious that that was our intention. 
Our intention was to work with him and to be as 
accommodating as possible. But they don't want us to take 
that deposition. That's all it boils down to. And that is 
a problem because we are also being faced with a motion for 
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1 protective order by the Tribune, which is saying, "We're 
2 not going to decide whether we want to even give you this 
3 tape until we see how your litigation plays out for a 
4 I while. And we'll see if your motion — if the motion to 
dismiss is granted, we'll see if the Court does this or 
that, and, by the way, we want you to take Mr. Cannon's 
deposition first." 
So we're — like I said, we're — we've got a 
factual dispute and a procedural logjam here, Your Honor, 
and there is no reason why we shouldn't be allowed to take 
Mr. Cannon's deposition. We'll do so at a convenient time, 
and I don't anticipate that it will be lengthy. But he is 
a litigant just like everybody else. He's not entitled to 
any particular protection or status just because he's a 
member of Congress. 
But, that being said, we'll certainly work with 
his schedule. We'll do all we can to work with him, as 
I've notified Counsel in writing before. 
We've briefed this issue. We think we're 
entitled to take his deposition. I can't imagine a reason 
that we're not. And it's our motion, so I'll hear what 
Counsel has to say and then I may have to respond a little 
bit. Thank you. 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, we don't believe you're 
entitled to take a deposition until you've stated a claim. 
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We filed our second motion to dismiss the amended complaint 
on July 10th, 18 days ago. Mr. Hoole has still not 
responded to that. Until he has stated a claim, he's not 
entitled to be a litigant and to take a deposition. If he 
states a claim under a lawsuit, then, obviously, we're 
going to cooperate in discovery consistent with 
Mr. Cannon's schedule, as we have repeatedly said with this 
Court. 
But it's been 18 days since we responded to his 
amended complaint, and he has filed no response to the 
motion to dismiss. Now, I think he has foregone that 
opportunity and I don't think he ought to be able to do 
discovery in the meantime. 
Now, this allegation that there's a factual 
dispute here is ridiculous. We accepted, for purposes of 
the motion to dismiss, everything he pled in his complaint, 
everything that he attached to his complaint, including the 
transcripts. We have never raised a dispute for purposes 
of this motion concerning anything that was reported in the 
newspaper article or that Mr. Hoole has alleged in his 
complaint. He doesn't have to take a deposition to 
establish whether those things were said or not. We have 
conceded them for purposes of this motion by virtue of 
filing a motion to dismiss. 
And we say they're not sufficient on their face. 
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And he has not responded to that in writing, although he 
has had more than adequate time under the law. And there 
is simply no reason for him to take a deposition if he 
can't state a claim. 
MR. HOOLE: I have nothing further on the motion 
to compel Mr. Cannon's deposition. If the Court would 
like, I could address the motion to compel discovery from 
the Tribune. 
THE COURT: You may proceed on that. 
MR. HOOLE: This is an interesting motion, Your 
Honor, and it raises a number of interesting questions for 
the Court. And, as the Court will remember, I went into 
the factual background of my conversation with Mr. Harry 
and — and whatnot, and that applies now to this motion as 
well. And let me just very quickly refresh the Court's 
memory. 
Mr. Harry called me on April 15th and said, 
"Guess what? Chris Cannon walked in, started to 
voluntarily talk about things and just announced all these 
things." I had no response. I couldn't respond, as I've 
already mentioned. 
But there was a significant disclosure by 
Mr. Cannon to the Tribune, and then I was asked for a 
response. It was like the Tribune, in giving me as much 
information as they wanted, to try and entice a response 
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out of me. I think they suspected I probably couldn't say 
too much. But it's significant that they wanted me to 
respond and so they hung the carrot out there on a stick to 
see if I'd go for it. 
They have filed a motion to quash the subpoena 
and a motion for a protective order. And we have tried to 
accommodate them by saying, "We will hold some of our 
subpoenas, all we want is the tape. Let us hear the tape 
first and then we'll decide whether or not we have to go 
further than that." 
Now, this tape, Your Honor, is contemporaneous 
evidence. It is what was said. It's nobody's 
recollection, it is not some kind of evidence of what was 
said, it is what was said. It was the actual statements by 
Mr. Cannon to the Tribune, to three reporters. It's not a 
confidential source. He said it on the record for the 
purpose of having a story run. It would be very 
interesting to ask Mr. Cannon in his deposition whether he 
would take the position that somehow his statements to the 
Tribune are privileged in his eyes. Does Mr. Cannon 
personally assert a privilege? I haven't been able to ask 
him that question. I don't think there is a privilege. 
The Tribune has indicated that they want more 
discovery done. They want this motion to dismiss decided. 
They want to do a little bit of investigation before they 
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decide whether or not they are going to release the tape 
voluntarily. They also claim a privilege. It's not a 
privilege that you'll find in the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
it's a privilege that was, according to their argument, 
judicially created. Following the Supreme Court's decision 
in Branzberg v. Hayes, at 408 U.S. 665, a 1972 United 
States Supreme Court case. 
The issue in that case, Your Honor, I think is 
important here. In that case there was a confidential 
source and — and let me make sure that that's the case. 
I'm not certain that that's the case, so let me correct 
myself. But what happened in that case is the reporters 
had information that was relevant to a grand jury 
proceeding. And they asserted a claim of privilege. And 
the court said that there is no privilege for a reporter 
and said, quote, "There is no reason to hold that these 
reporters, any more than any other citizen, should be 
excused from furnishing information that may help the grand 
jury in arriving at its initial determination," close 
quote. 408 U.S. at 702. 
Your Honor, our situation is the same. We have— 
we have a voluntary statement made to three reporters in a 
meeting, a free-for-all discussion. It wasn't a 
confidential source, it's contemporaneous evidence. We're 
not wishing to burden the Tribune by this, but this 
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evidence is central to our case. It's absolutely critical. 
I think it's important to note that there have 
been some Circuit Court opinions after the United States 
Supreme Court decision which have, in some form, fashioned 
a very narrow reporter's privilege. But in the motion to 
quash filed by the Tribune, every one of those cases cited, 
with the exception of one Ninth Circuit case, dealt with a 
confidential source. There's no claim of confidentiality 
here. Mr. Harry said that on the tape recording. I would 
assume Mr. Cannon would not try to hide behind the 
reporter's privilege after doing what he did. 
Your Honor, the Tribune argues that they will be 
somehow prejudiced because they're subject to great expense 
and burden. I'll pay for the tape. I just need one copy. 
That's all I need. This is different from most cases where 
they may be burdened by people trying to do discovery 
through their efforts. But this is not discovery through 
their efforts. The action arose in their office and they, 
like any other citizen who may have a recording of the 
events, need to turn over the tape. 
I wrote a letter to counsel for the Tribune, and 
I said in that letter — and that's at page 11 of my 
memorandum in opposition to their — to their motion to 
quash. At page 11, it says: It is not my intention to 
inconvenience the Tribune or its staff. In fact, it is 
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likely that the depositions of the reporters will not be 
necessary once I obtain the contemporaneous tape of what 
was said. Accordingly, before proceeding with depositions 
on May 19th, 1998, I propose that the Tribune produce a 
copy of its tape after receiving the actual contemporaneous 
recording, I will very likely cancel the depositions and 
not reschedule them, unless Mr. Cannon later disputes his 
statements to the Tribune or the context in which they were 
made.ff 
I just want the evidence. I'm not trying to 
burden the Tribune. 
They have talked about this reporter's privilege. 
Let's assume for purposes of this argument that a narrow 
privilege exists. That privilege can be overcome. There's 
a balancing test, Your Honor, that's been announced by the 
courts. The balancing test requires a determination of 
relevancy, necessary — necessity, a termination of whether 
or not the information sought goes to the heart of the 
matter, and whether the information can be found elsewhere. 
• With respect to the first prong, relevancy, I 
think it's beyond dispute that that tape's relevant. I 
won't even spend more time on that. It's addressed in my 
brief. 
With respect to necessity, that's the evidence. 
That's what happened. It's absolutely necessary. This — 
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this issue was addressed by Magistrate Judge Ronald Boyce 
in the Bottomly case. And in that case, relying on the 
Silkwood and the Grand Buchette case, the court stated, 
quote, "There is no indication that defendant's inquiries 
have been or will be successful in leading to the discovery 
of admissible evidence. The inquiry and possible evidence 
from the deposition of movants is not of central importance 
or crucial to the case." 
Well, Judge Boyce found that balancing this 
reporter's privilege against the need of discovery that 
what they wanted to find out through discovery wasn't 
important, wasn't part of the central case. I submit that 
it is our case. There's nothing that goes to the heart of 
the case more than these tapes — than this tape. And we -
- under Judge Boyce's analysis, clearly, this reporter's 
privilege is distinguished. We clearly meet the burden. 
Availability from other sources. I submit that 
the papers filed by the defendants in this case have stated 
matters which, compared to the Tribune's statements, which 
are also a part of the record in this case, are very huge 
issues of credibility that need to be ferreted out in 
discovery. I am not so naive to think that if I were to 
ask Mr. Cannon what was said that I would get a full and 
complete understanding of that as compared to the tape. I 
just don't think that anything is going to suffice but the 
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tape in this case, and nothing will get this issue resolved 
faster than a disclosure of this tape. 
The nature of the information is absolutely 
critical. This was not a confidential source. That's what 
these cases are about. It's not a confidential source. 
And even if it was, that claim of privilege was laid, Your 
Honor, when Dan Harry called me and said, "This is what 
I've just been told." The Court has the transcript of that 
conversation in front of him. He said, "This is what I've 
been told," and goes through all of the things that he can 
recall and says, "Well, I'll have to go back and check my 
notes, but this is what's happening. What's your 
response?" 
He's clearly trying to get me to respond. They 
are waiving the privilege. And there's a very interesting 
case, and I've cited it at page 18 and 19 of my memorandum 
in opposition to the motion to quash. It's a Utah case, 
1964. It deals with the spousal privilege, but it's 
instructive here. And I'd like to just read that quote 
because I think it's very important. 
It says: The defendant could either claim the 
privilege or waive it, whichever it thought would be best— 
would be to its best advantage. 
They don't have to assert it, they can claim or 
they can waive it. And if the Court even reads their 
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filings, they haven't decided whether to claim it or to 
waive it. They want more to happen. They want to see the 
outcome today. But beyond that, it was waived when that 
conversation took place between me and Mr. Harry. 
The court goes on in this 1964 case, State v. 
Brown: But it could not engage in halfway measures by 
waiving the privilege and obtaining the benefit of having 
the witness testify and still claim some of the protection 
refusal to testify affords. They can't have it both ways, 
the court says. You can't waive it and then claim it. If 
the privilege is claimed, it should be scrupulously 
protected. But when it is waived, it is done away with, 
just as though it did not exist, and the witness is then in 
the same status and subject to the same treatment as any 
other witness; no more, no less. 
Well, Your Honor, I've mentioned that we are in a 
dilemma. The Tribune says, "Take Cannon's deposition 
first; let's see how things turn out." Cannon's saying, 
"Dismiss my case; don't take my deposition." There's 
factual disputes here and, frankly, we need the Court to 
help us get through this logjam and be able to proceed with 
this case. Thank you. 
MS. SONNENREICH: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Counsel has done a masterful job of reasserting 
that there is no fact — that there are factual disputes 
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here. But I think the most telling statement he made was 
when he attempted to characterize for you what that factual 
dispute is. Mr. Hoole said that you have a factual dispute 
between statements made in the Tribune and Mr. Cannon's 
statement that his only breach was a failure to notify 
Mr. Hoole. That is not a factual dispute at all. What 
that is is a legal issue that's appropriate to resolve in a 
motion to dismiss. 
Mr. Cannon does not deny a word of what he said 
to the Salt Lake Tribune. As I understand it, he doesn't 
deny a word of what he said earlier in February in the 
interview that he gave to the Deseret News. The issue is: 
Did those statements that he does not disclaim making 
constitute either one of the cluster of torts that he has 
asserted under Utah common law, or a violation of the 
settlement agreement? That is not an issue that requires 
any third-party discovery whatsoever. 
He is willing to say, "Yes, I said those things." 
The issue is how does the common law and how does the law 
of contracts under the settlement agreement apply to those? 
Let me address very briefly an issue relating to 
the language of the confidentiality agreement before I get 
into making some rebuttal comments concerning the nature of 
the reporter's privilege. 
Ms. Wood has done a very thorough job in her 
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brief in addressing the elements of the various tort 
claims. It seems to me that the real issue will boil down 
to whether the statements made to the Tribune and not 
disputed constitute a violation of this settlement 
agreement. All of us, as third parties, and you, frankly, 
as the court, are at something of a disadvantage because we 
can only see one little piece of the settlement agreement. 
But the little piece that we do see, there are a couple of 
ways to interpret. 
The settlement agreement promises that Mr. Cannon 
will not, after February 9th, disclose anything other than 
permitted by paragraph E. One way to read this is to say 
that: The parties agree that they will not disclose 
confidential information, except that on Monday, February 
9th, they're going to make this joint statement that's 
quoted and, E, thereafter, if further pressured by the 
media and asked specifically whether the Cannon entities 
have contributed, they can make these statements. 
It doesn't say that that is a series of events 
that's anticipated. It would be perfectly logical to read 
that as saying if, at any point, Rep. Cannon gets 
pressured, he can talk to Mr. Hoole and, at that point and 
thereafter, he is allowed to make the statements outlined 
in the settlement agreement. That is a very logical way to 
read it in light of the way media functions in this world. 
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Once he has said that to the Deseret News, felt 
that he was pressured, disclosed to Mr. Hoole, he was free 
to go to the Tribune, to The Hill newspaper, anyone else, 
and make the same or similar statements. I think this 
should be read as kind of a trap door; once it happens, 
it's happened. There's nothing in here that requires 
Mr. Cannon to go back to Mr. Hoole at each event of 
potential disclosure under the agreement. 
Therefore, since he does not dispute that in 
February he gave — he was notified of the right to do 
this, I think it would be very difficult for the Court to 
find this to be a breach of the agreement for him to go 
and, in essence, give the same type of interview and make 
the same type of statements to the Tribune a few months 
later, or to The Hill or anyone else. 
There is definitely a reporter's privilege 
recognized both by Utah law and by the Federal 
constitution. Rule 501 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
incorporates all constitutional privileges. There is 
obviously a constitutional quasi-privilege for reporters. 
Mr. Hoole is absolutely correct, the media lost 
the original 1972 court case. However, in the seeds of 
that defeat were the creation of the quasi-privilege, which 
has two elements. First is the element of centrality. 
Second is a requirement that all other sources for the 
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information be first exhausted. In that regard, it's kind 
of like a work product privilege, where attorneys' work 
product, like reporters1 work product may, under some 
circumstances, be available but it is not ever the first 
line of resort. 
I am simply baffled by how Mr. Hoole can make a 
distinction between confidential sources and non-
confidential sources. Let me read you squibs from two 
cases that are cited in our briefing. 
"This distinction between confidential and non-
confidential information is utterly irrelevant to the 
chilling effect that the enforcement of these subpoenas 
would have on the flow of information to the press and the 
public. To compel production of a reporter's resource 
material is equally as insidious as a compelled disclosure 
of confidential informants." 
In another case that we cite, and these are on 
page 7 of our reply memo: "The reporter's qualified 
privilege applies to all information acquired by the 
reporter in gathering news, regardless of whether the 
information is confidential, because the purpose of the 
privilege is to assure to the fullest extent possible, the 
free flow of information to the public." 
In light of that case law, it's simply silly to 
say that they're — that the cases make a distinction 
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between confidential and non-confidential. They don't. 
The tape recording of Rep. Cannon is one of the Tribunefs 
source materials. It is as privileged as the photographs 
of the traffic accident discussed in one of the Tenth 
Circuit cases laid out in our briefs. 
There are, as I said, two prongs to meeting that 
privilege. The first issue is centrality. In this case, 
were there a factual dispute between what Mr. Cannon says 
he said to the Tribune and what the Tribune reported that 
he said I would concede that there was centrality to this 
issue. But there is no dispute whatsoever as to what 
Mr. Cannon said. It's just a matter of applying the law to 
that. 
Mr. Hoole also fails the second prong, which is 
the availability of other sources. The first and prime and 
best source of what Mr. Cannon said, should he ever dispute 
it, would be Mr. Cannon. There were also two aides 
accompanying him to that interview, neither of whom has any 
sort of privilege that they could assert. Those are the 
sources who should be exhausted first, if in fact the 
complaint is found to state a cause of action at all. 
Those are the people who should be examined before anyone 
with a privilege or a quasi-privilege even enters the arena 
of discovery. 
As to the issue of waiver and the Utah case State 
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v. Brown, Your Honor, I invite you, please read the case. 
What happened there is Mr. Brown was alleged to have 
committed a rape. Mrs. Brown did not take the stand at the 
first trial. There was an appeal of the rape conviction. 
At the second trial, the prosecutor examined her as to why 
she hadn't testified in the first trial, and issues of 
privilege came up in that context. But what it really is 
is a case about credibility. Was the prosecutor entitled 
to say to Mrs. Brown on the stand, "Gee, Mrs. Brown, this 
is mighty interesting that when your husband was first 
accused of this crime, you didn't testify about his alibi 
and today you're here with an alibi. How come?" 
The Utah Supreme Court had no difficulty with 
that at all. But it's just not a case about privilege, 
although it certainly made some interesting reading. There 
is no such thing as a waiver of the reporter's privilege by 
talking to the other side in a dispute. 
Mr. Hoole began his remarks to you today by 
complaining how totally unfair this was. Mr. Cannon went 
to the Tribune and made his statements about it, but he 
couldn't say anything. That seems to completely undercut 
his argument that, by asking him to say something, the 
privilege is waived. 
All the Tribune did was go to Mr. Hoole and say, 
"This is what we're going to print about what Mr. Cannon 
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5 
says about your client, and he says that he's willing to 
2 I waive confidentiality. Whatfs your version of events?" 
3 We would have loved absolutely nothing better 
4 ] than to have Mr. Hoole and Ms. Crelley give us a full 
interview on the record telling us their version of events. 
6 I Instead, they wait until we publish what Mr. Cannon 
7 | indisputably said and then try to come in through the back 
door to attack that reporting, not by giving us their own 
version of events, but by asserting that they're entitled 
to fish around in the reportage process, even though the 
complaint may not state a cause of action. 
And I submit that that is wrong in a case dealing 
with a quasi-privilege and it would be wrong dealing with 
any witness, because third-party witnesses of any sort 
should not be burdened until a plaintiff has been able to 
set forth a cause of action. And in the case of a quasi-
privilege, until all other evidence going to that cause of 
action — in the event there is in fact a dispute about 
that evidence — has been exhausted. Thank you. 
MR. HOOLE: I'll be very brief, Your Honor. 
I didn't realize Ms. Sonnenreich was Ms. Wood's 
co-counsel, but they've certainly teamed up together on 
this to try and deny our discovery. 
It's stated that Mr. Cannon — at least by 
Ms. Sonnenreich, that Mr. Cannon doesn't deny a word he 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
64 
said to the Tribune. The question then is: What did he 
say to the Tribune? That is not covered completely by what 
Mr. Harry could remember and told me. What he said to the 
Tribune needs to be known. The only way to find that out 
is by listening to the tape. 
Ms. Sonnenreich suggests that we need to exhaust 
all other sources. And we have tried to take Mr. Cannon's 
deposition and he has filed a motion for protective order. 
We're trying to do what we're supposed to do. 
Ms. Sonnenreich suggests that there's some lack 
of distinction between a confidential source and a non-
confidential source. I disagree with that. I think 
Mr. Harry made it very clear that this was no confidential 
source. "He was speaking voluntarily on the record, wanted 
me to write his story." That is what was said to 
Mr. Harry. At least that's what Mr. Harry said to me. 
It's not a confidential source. We all know the difference 
between a confidential source, one that does have some 
protection and somebody who just wants their story said. 
There is a big difference there. 
And, finally, Your Honor, with respect to the 
waiver, this privilege, if it exists at all, and the 
Supreme Courts says it does not, no higher court has ever 
said that it does, if it exists at all, the balancing test 
is in our favor. Moreover the privilege has been waived. 
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Read the case State v. Brown. Also read Rule 507 of the 
Rules of Evidence, which states — and I have a copy for 
the Court and counsel, if I may approach. 
Rule 507, Your Honor, states — and this is in 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, the part that deals with 
privileges — after discussing what privileges are 
available in Utah, it says: A person upon whom these rules 
confirm — confer a privilege against disclosure of the 
confidential matter or communication waives the privilege 
if a person or a predecessor, while holder of the 
privilege, voluntarily discloses or consents to the 
disclosure of any significant part of the matter or 
communication. 
I submit that Mr. Harry disclosed significant 
parts of the matter of communication in an effort to try 
and get me to comment on what Mr. Cannon had said and, 
therefore, waived any privilege that might attach. Thank 
you. 
THE COURT: Counsel, here's the way I look at 
this case, and this is my ruling. 
First of all, of course, the issue as far as the 
complaint's been resolved, and which I think is proper, as 
has been stated here and the rules do provide the right to 
amend a complaint on one occasion prior to responsive 
pleadings being filed. And so the Court has accepted 
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defendant's complaint. I'm of the opinion the motion to 
dismiss then goes to amend the complaint. 
I'm also of the opinion that this is probably a 
motion that, under the Rule B motion, that they have the 
right to bring that motion prior to the discovery being 
made, prior to further pleadings in the case. Therefore, 
the Court feels compelled to rule on that motion at this 
point. And I'm of the opinion that the — Where's the 
complaint now — that the motion to dismiss is well taken 
as to the third claim for relief, which is defined as 
defamation and invasion of privacy. 
The fourth cause of action entitled Infliction of 
Emotional Distress and the punitive damages claim. The 
Court is denying the motion at this time as to the first 
cause of action entitled Breach of Contract, and the second 
cause of action, A Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing. The Court would grant the plaintiff's 
motion for enlargement of time to reply to the motion to 
dismiss regarding those matters. The Court at this time 
also is — I was going to say deny, and maybe that's what 
I'm doing, maybe it's just suspend — denying or suspending 
the right to take Mr. Cannon's deposition until such time 
as this — the enlargement of time has been complied with 
and briefs been filed regarding that. 
The Court is also of the opinion that the motion 
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1 I to obtain the tapes from the Tribune Corporation is not 
2 [ well taken at this time and would deny the motion to obtain 
3 that material until after this motion — until this 
4 I enlargement of time has been complied with. 
I guess what I'm saying is that I'm granting the 
12(b) motion as to two or three causes of action. I'm 
giving time to have the matter more fully briefed, as the 
other two. I'm holding in abeyance reading my ruling on 
the right to take the deposition of Mr. Cannon and the 
right to the discovery from the Tribune Corporation, as far 
as the tapes and — of the interview is concerned. And 
that if the plaintiff is able to survive the enlargement of 
time and the 12(b) motion for the other two causes of 
action, then, in all probability, the Court is going to — 
no question I'm going to give him further discovery in the 
matter, as far as depositions and/or possibly getting into 
the tapes. 
I would make the order — and, of course, I think 
the Tribune has indicated this — that they are not to 
destroy any tapes or any materials which they have 
concerning this matter. 
Any questions? 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, when will Mr. Hoole 
respond to our motion to dismiss? 
THE COURT: Mr. Hoole? 
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MR. HOOLE: 
that within ten days 
l to put us 
Could we 
brief? 
THE 
MS. 
COURT: 
WOOD: 
Your Honor, I -
That's fine. 
And then we can 
— I think I can do 
have — that's going 
right in the middle of a trial, Your Honor. 
have 
THE 
MR. 
they're going 
Mr. Hoole 
trial. 
THE 
MR. 
MS. 
it till after the trial to file a reply 
COURT: 
HOOLE: 
I have no problem. 
If I could then have 15 days, since 
to be in trial. 
COURT: 
HOOLE: 
WOOD: 
when we'll 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MS. 
COURT: 
HOOLE: 
COURT: 
WOOD : 
(Whereupon, 
You may have 15 days. 
Thank you. 
Okay. And then we'll work out with 
file our reply when we get out of 
Who's going to prepare the orders? 
I'd be happy to, Your Honor. 
Thank you, Mr. 
Thank you, Your 
at the hour of 
the hearing was concluded. 
-oooOooo-
Hoole. 
Honor. 
9:44 a.m., 
) 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1998, 8:00 AM 
-oooOooo-
THE COURT: The matter before the Court is the 
case of Crelley Mackey v. Chris Cannon. 
Are the plaintiffs present and ready to proceed? 
MR. HOOLE: Yes, Your Honor. Roger Hoole and 
Heather Morrison on behalf of the plaintiff. 
THE COURT: Now, the defendant? 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, Mary Anne Wood and Sheri 
Mower on behalf of the defendant. 
THE COURT: This comes before the Court on 
defendant's motion to dismiss? 
MS. WOOD: It does, Your Honor. However, we, if 
you recall, argued that motion back in August, and 
plaintiff — the Court dismissed all allegations except for 
two, and plaintiff requested the opportunity to — for 
additional briefing. That's now complete and we don't 
think it adds anything. And I think it would be 
appropriate for the plaintiff to tell us why he thinks he's 
now stating a claim and then I'd be happy to respond. 
MR. HOOLE: I'll go in either order, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
MR. HOOLE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
As the Court will recall, this matter arises out 
of a confidential settlement agreement entered into by my 
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client, Mr. Cannon, and other parties in February of 1998 
and Mr. Cannon's subsequent voluntary and unilateral action 
of going to the Tribune and expressing his opinions and 
views regarding the matters which were made moot by the 
settlement agreement and which, by the settlement 
agreement, the parties agreed there would be no further 
comment on by the parties. 
We have, in our memorandum beginning at page 2, 
laid out our factual allegations from the complaint. And 
because, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, these factual 
allegations are deemed to be true, as acknowledged by the 
defendants in their papers, I'd like just for a minute to 
go through them. Because I think itfs important to state 
the allegations in the complaint to show the Court that the 
claims have been properly pleaded and the matter is 
appropriately before the Court and the other side should be 
required to file their answer to these things, if that has 
not already been done. I don't recall. But, in any event, 
let me start with the facts and go through them very 
briefly, as I mentioned. And this starts at page 2 of our 
memorandum. 
Paragraph 1 just references the fact that the 
settlement agreement was entered into on February 9th of 
this year, and that's paragraph 9 of the complaint. 
Paragraph 2 on page 2 of our papers indicates 
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that the settlement agreement not only resolved and 
rendered moot the factual and legal allegations which had 
existed between the parties prior to the time of the 
settlement, but also did a very important thing, and that 
is it, by agreement of the parties, prohibited the parties 
from further disclosing any such factual or legal 
allegations by language expressly contained in the 
settlement agreement. And that language is found at page 3 
of our memorandum and is very important. 
And, Your Honor, I intend to address that 
language in more detail in my presentation, so I will not 
take the time to read that lengthy paragraph to the Court 
at this point. I'm sure the Court is already aware of its 
contents. But I will reference it in more detail later. 
That, however, is contained at paragraph 10 of the 
complaint. 
Paragraph 11 of the complaint indicates that on 
April 15th of this year, months after this settlement 
agreement had been entered into and months after the media 
problems with this case had died down, Mr. Cannon, 
apparently concerned about happenings in Washington and his 
role on the Judiciary Committee, walked into the Salt Lake 
Tribune and met with, apparently, three reporters, obtained 
their attention and, for the purpose of having a newspaper 
article run, expressed his opinions and his conclusions as 
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to the factual allegations and the legal disputes that had 
been in dispute which had been made moot by the settlement 
agreement and which, by the settlement agreement, were 
expressly made confidential. In other words, there were 
two parts to this agreement. All of the factual 
allegations and legal disputes prior to February 9 were 
rendered moot, they were settled. 
The second part is that nobody would talk about 
it anymore. We agreed on that and went through very 
elaborate provisions in the settlement agreement's 
confidentiality clause in order to assure that only certain 
things would be said and only then under certain 
conditions. 
And our factual allegations continue. He made 
voluntary statements, those statements were opinions, they 
comprised factual allegations, they comprised legal 
allegations, and the whole purpose of doing that was to get 
the article published in the Tribune the next day. 
Those allegations include — or those statements 
by Mr. Cannon include the following. And I'd like to point 
out for the Court that Counsel has submitted, with their 
memorandum, copies of all these newspaper articles. These 
are obtained from the internet, as I understand it. But 
copies of all of these newspaper articles which had run 
regarding the parties' dispute before the settlement took 
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place. 
And it was the back — this is the media backdrop 
in which this case arose, and this is the reason, Your 
Honor, why the confidentiality provision was so important 
to my client and other parties to this settlement 
agreement. 
In any event, against this media backdrop and 
despite the fact that the parties had mooted their factual 
and legal disputes, settled them and agreed that they would 
not talk about this case further, despite all of those 
things, and knowing that my client was bound by a 
confidentiality agreement which is plain on its face, and 
knowing that he was bound by the confidentiality agreement, 
Mr. Cannon made a number of statements to the Tribune, only 
some of which we know. And those statements are summarized 
on page 4. And they're important because they could not be 
responded to by my client, given the confidential nature of 
this settlement. 
They are that my client, Crelley Mackey, has the 
ability to waive confidentiality. That is not true. That 
is a bold-faced misrepresentation. She has no ability to 
waive confidentiality. She and Mr. Cannon are not the only 
parties to this settlement agreement. 
Second — 
THE COURT: Who are all the parties to it? 
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MR. HOOLE: There are a number of parties, Your 
Honor, of the settlement agreement, including Mr. Warren, 
Mr. Cannon's former chief of staff, against who certain 
allegations had previously been made; a number of 
Mr. Cannon's business entities were also parties; his 
political campaign, which is an entity, was a party; the 
Congressional Office of Chris Cannon, which is his office 
in Washington, D.C. A separate entity was also a party. 
There were a number of attorneys involved in this 
settlement and probably a dozen or so parties. 
THE COURT: Did they sign on the confidentiality 
agreement? 
MR. HOOLE: All of them signed. And Mr. Cannon 
would like this to be viewed as if he can unilaterally tell 
the public that Ms. Mackey can waive confidentiality. She 
simply can't do that. The confidentiality provision was 
the cornerstone of this settlement. It would not have 
happened without that. It would not have happened without 
that. It was extremely important to the parties, and 
that's why it's so lengthy and so detailed. 
So against this media backdrop and the parties' 
agreement not to talk further and Ms. Mackey's inability to 
speak further in response to Mr. Cannon's allegations, he 
says that she has the ability to waive confidentiality. He 
says that they are not holding her to confidentiality 
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! | misrepresentations. He says that although she is free to 
2 j discuss it, there would be no benefit for her to talk about 
3 it publicly, leaving a horrendous burden on her and many 
4 implications which involve those factual allegations and 
5 those legal disputes which were settled which she can no 
6 longer respond to. He does this, to her injury. 
He says that there was no impropriety on his 
part. He says that there was no hostile environment in his 
9 | office; that there was nothing to her allegations; that 
Ms. Mackey's allegations had no merit and that they 
wouldn't have held up — he's speaking as a congressman, 
he's speaking as an attorney, he's speaking as a party to 
this case in a media situation that — that — that follows 
every one of his words, and he puts Ms. Mackey in a very, 
very difficult situation where she cannot respond to these 
inappropriate comments. 
So that's what happened on April 15th. The next 
day, the Tribune ran an article. And Counsel suggests that 
because all of this stuff had been in the paper before, 
that even though we had a confidentiality agreement in the 
settlement agreement, it doesn't matter and he is free to 
say virtually everything he wants, virtually anything he 
wants is, I believe, the quote from Counsel. And I can — 
I can tell you, Your Honor, that these articles contain 
inflammatory things and Ms. Mackey, against this media 
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backdrop, had entered into a settlement agreement in good 
faith, as did other parties. And Mr. Cannon has simply not 
honored that, not at all. Ms. Mackey has had no remedy but 
to bring an action in order to address that. That's all 
she can do under the terms of the agreement. 
I have now covered the essential facts which give 
rise to our two pending claims, which are breach of 
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
The next thing I want to address, Your Honor, is 
the issue of materiality. Mr. Cannon submits that this was 
not material, that this stuff was already out there, that 
it had been published months earlier. I submit that it was 
material because we had bargained that nobody would talk 
about it again. 
At paragraph 20 of the complaint, we state in 
summary fashion the allegation that Mr. Cannon, 
individually and/or acting on behalf of the employing 
office, the campaign, and the Cannon entities, materially 
breached the settlement agreement by disclosing 
confidential information and expressing opinions regarding 
the same. That states a claim, in light of the other 
factual allegations in the complaint. That states a claim 
for breach of contract. 
It is responded to by Counsel in their papers 
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that they've already filed with the court that the only 
thing that they didn't do, the only fault they could have 
laid at their feet is that Mr. Cannon himself, or through 
one of his attorneys, didn't call me before going to the 
Tribune to tell me he was going to the Tribune. 
Now, that's very interesting, and I'd like to 
explore that with the Court, because that whole thing is a 
red herring, Your Honor. And I think it will become very 
clear, because at this point, I want to talk about the 
actual language of the settlement agreement that is the 
confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement. 
There are, essentially, five parts of the 
confidentiality provision. The first one is the general 
statement. I'd like to read that. That is broken down on 
page 5 of my material, but Your Honor may wish to refer to 
page 3, where the entire language is set forth. And I'll 
begin at the top, reading that provision. It says — and 
this was expressly agreed to by the parties. It says: 
What comments can be made and under what 
circumstances? Any comments regarding the parties' past 
disputes and factual differences, legal disputes, can be 
addressed. 
It says: The parties agree that the factual and 
legal allegations relating to their claims and disputes 
arising prior to the date of this agreement — and that was 
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February 9th — shall be confidential and that they shall 
not disclose to any third party that confidential 
information. The terms of settlement or the amount of the 
payments made under the settlement agreement except, A, to 
their attorneys, therapists, tax advisers or their 
ecclesiastical leaders, or as required by law. 
Your Honor, the defense, as I understand it, is 
arguing that that means anything they want to talk about 
after February 9th is okay. Well, that's not at all the 
case. We agreed that the matter would be resolved, itfs 
made moot, and nobody would talk further, other than as set 
forth in the confidentiality agreement. 
Not only was the matter settled, but the parties 
expressly agreed that the factual and legal allegations 
relating to the claims and disputes between them were 
confidentiality and that the parties would not discuss or 
disclose those issues or their opinions regarding those 
issues to any third party. It's clearly what the first 
part of the settlement agreement says, "except to their 
attorneys, therapists, tax advisors, or their 
ecclesiastical leaders, or as required by law." 
Now, I've mentioned the media backdrop, and it 
was enormous. We knew, Your Honor, we knew that there 
would be media pressure to try and find out what the 
settlement was all about. And so we, over a matter of 
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1 weeks, negotiated this settlement agreement and the 
2 confidentiality clause in order to deal with the problem of 
3 what happens if the media contacts somebody and wants a 
4 statement. 
5 So the confidentiality clause goes on, and it 
6 i says that, basically, there is an agreed-upon sentence, one 
7 sentence that the parties can say on February 9 of this 
8 year, which we will release to the media, which will 
g resolve this issue. And it says, in quotes: 
"Ms. Mackey's claims have been resolved to the 
parties1 satisfaction." And pursuant to the settlement 
agreement, I released that statement to the media. 
"Ms. Mackey's claims have been resolved to the parties1 
satisfaction." That's what was expressly agreed to. And 
that was the one sentence that, apparently, appeared in a 
Deseret News article later on in addition to, I think, in 
the Tribune. That is very important. That's all that we 
agreed would be released. 
We anticipated that there still may be some 
pressure, and we had a provision built into the settlement 
agreement which dealt with that contingency. And we agreed 
that if there was further media pressure, and after being 
asked about that, we would — we would agree to say — and 
I'll — this is also language in the — in the 
confidentiality provision, and I'll read it. 
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It says: "Thereafter, if further pressured by 
the media and asked specifically whether the Cannon 
entities or individuals contributed money to the 
settlement, Mr. Cannon or his representatives may respond, 
having spoken with Roger H. Hoole, that no Cannon entities 
or campaign contributed to any settlement.11 
"That no Cannon entities or campaign contributed 
to any settlement." And, Your Honor, that happened. I was 
called and an article, as I've referenced, was run in the 
Deseret News where that was said. So we're on track with 
the settlement agreement. There's no problem with that. 
We had — we had one more provision, and it was 
important to the parties that this matter be laid to rest. 
And the last provision in the settlement agreement states 
as follows: "Other than as specifically allowed herein, 
the parties and their attorneys shall not volunteer any 
confidential information, and in response to any request 
for information by any person or entity shall only — 
excuse me — shall say only 'No comment.'" 
So we've gone through these various stages to 
deal with the media, ending at a point where the parties 
agree that the only thing that they will say, after having 
stated what was agreed upon expressly by the parties, the 
only thing that they will say is "No comment." And that's 
where we were, Your Honor. We were at the "no comment" 
81 
stage when Mr. Cannon went in to the Tribune, Never 
notified me. I was completely unaware of it. I didn't 
find out about it until I got called by the Tribune for a 
comment, which I couldn't give. I couldn't respond to 
these allegations. 
It is significant to the specific language which 
the parties agreed to as set forth and was agreed to by 
everybody. This is very troubling, Your Honor, that 
Mr. Cannon would accept the benefit of this settlement 
agreement, agree to it, sign off, follow the steps and 
then, when it was politically expedient for him, vitiate 
the entire thing and the entire purpose of the settlement 
agreement, leaving my client seriously damaged. 
The language is clear. And if I have somehow not 
made myself clear about that, I would encourage the Court 
to again look at that entire settlement agreement, 
particularly paragraph 6, which is the confidentiality 
clause, and see what was allowed under what circumstances 
and what was not allowed. 
• Mr. Cannon made his comments that Ms. Mackey had 
the ability to waive confidentiality, that they were not 
holding her to confidentiality, that although she is free 
to discuss it, she probably won't in the public, that there 
was no impropriety on his part, et cetera, et cetera. 
Those are material breaches of this settlement agreement. 
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They were made — these comments were made against this 
2 I backdrop of media and speculation and had been met with 
3 only silence by Ms. Mackey. 
4 As I understand the position of the defense, it 
5 is that, because this had already been out there, 
6 Mr. Cannon was not bound by the confidentiality agreement 
and he was free to express his opinions and that he could 
say virtually anything. 
Q I They also claim that their only — their only 
default was in not talking with me first. Those are not 
accurate statements. And if they are presented to this 
Court, I would suggest that the Court take a hard look at 
that, because that is not at all what this settlement 
agreement says. 
Your Honor — 
THE COURT: Did they talk to you first? 
MR. HOOLE: Excuse me? 
THE COURT: Did they talk to you first? 
MR. HOOLE: No. No. They called me one time, as 
I recall, before the Deseret News article ran. And I have 
no problem with the Deseret News article. It appears to be 
in compliance with the — that is the quoted portion of 
Mr. Cannon's representative. The part they quoted and 
attributed to him is in compliance, as near as I can tell, 
with the settlement agreement. But that was months 
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earlier. When they walked in to the Tribune, they didnft 
contact me, and that was at the "no comment" stage. There 
would be no purpose to contact me. We'd gone through all 
the other steps, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, you're confusing me. As I read 
the material, I got the impression they had never contacted 
you. Now you're telling me they contacted you prior to the 
Deseret News article. Was this prior to the articles being 
written by the Tribune and Mr. Taggert going in the office? 
MR. HOOLE: Yes. Much, much earlier. 
THE COURT: But it was after the settlement 
agreement was signed, the confidential agreement was signed 
but prior to the Tribune article? 
MR. HOOLE: Yes. The settlement agreement was 
signed February 9th. The Tribune ran an article the next 
day, and the Deseret News article was February 11th. So it 
was months before Mr. Cannon unilaterally walked in to the 
Tribune. 
You know, I'm not that concerned by the fact that 
he didn't call me. But he couldn't have said what he said 
even if he had called me. That's a red herring, Your 
Honor, I believe, and they've tried to make that the issue. 
But the fact is, he couldn't say what he said. He had 
agreed to be silent on the issue. That's the point. And 
we were at the "no comment" stage. 
84 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Now, we've already discussed this in some detail 
previously, and we had a disagreement whether or not — 
that is, Counsel had a disagreement whether or not Utah 
recognizes the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. And it also — and then the Court allowed me to 
brief that, and I set forth the authority — some of the 
authority in Utah which clearly states that is recognized 
in every contract. 
But what is the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing and are we trying to use that to create 
new independent rights and claims? Well, the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is very simple. It 
says that if there is a dispute over what a contract means, 
the court is able to look at what the purpose of the 
contract was and determine whether or not the parties have 
acted in furtherance of the purpose of the contract. In 
other words, each party to a contract has an implied 
obligation to perform the contract in such a way that the 
other side gets the fruits and the benefits of the 
contract. 
I submit that the contract, on its face, can 
easily — on its face means that Ms. Mackey can reasonably 
expect that Mr. Cannon won't say anything not expressly 
permitted by the settlement agreement. That was what she 
entered into the contract for; that was her expected 
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1 benefit; that was the bargain she reached. 
2 And I bring up the implied covenant of good faith 
3 and fair dealing because the defense seems to not 
4 understand that. They would like to say that 
5 confidentiality provision had no bearing on what Mr. Cannon 
6 said after the settlement agreement. And it's simply 
7 contrary to common sense, it's contrary to the language of 
8 the settlement agreement itself, it's contrary to the 
purpose of the entire settlement. 
The purpose of the settlement was to allow the 
parties to put this matter behind them so that no more 
churning of the media would occur. That was the purpose. 
Ms. Mackey was entitled to the reasonable expectations of 
the contract. That has been vitiated. 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing clearly exists in Utah. It applies in every 
contract. It is an obligation that is imposed by law. It 
cannot be waived. It cannot be disclaimed. It is there. 
We submit that, by acting the way he did and by 
claiming that he is virtually — that he is free to say 
virtually anything he wants, he not only breaches the 
contract, but he breaches the implied covenant within that 
contract. And we are not asking the Court to give 
Ms. Mackey additional claims or other causes of action 
which — which are in addition to the claims that she's 
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otherwise entitled to. In other words, Ms. Mackey is not 
saying, ffI canft make out a contract claim, so give me the 
implied covenant." Ms. Mackey is saying, "I've got a 
contract claim. I've stated it clearly. It's pleaded 
well, but Mr. Cannon suggests that he doesn't think the 
purpose of the settlement agreement was to obtain the 
parties' confidentiality agreement." And because of that 
misunderstanding, Ms. Mackey has the right to bring the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to have the 
Court focus on what the purposes of the contract were. 
What was the purpose of that agreement? 
Her claim is that Mr. Cannon has violated his 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in performing the 
contract. She's not asking this Court to invent new 
claims, as suggested by the defense. She is asking the 
Court to enforce the agreement and give her the benefit of 
the contract she entered into. 
Now, Mr. Cannon not only believes, apparently, 
that he can say almost anything he wants, he has 
demonstrated that belief by acting on it. And he has, in a 
way, reserved to himself, wrongfully, this ability to go 
out and talk to anybody about this, the media or whoever he 
wants. By doing that, under Utah law, he has, rightfully 
or wrongfully, retained discretion in the performance and— 
in how he performs his obligations under the implied 
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covenant. And under Utah law, that puts a higher duty on 
him, a heightened duty on him to perform the contract in a 
way which does not deprive the other side of the benefits 
of the bargain. And, in that sense, the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing really explains what's gone 
on in this case. This cause of action really focuses on — 
on the problem and highlights it. 
Ms. Mackey's reasonable expectation was that all 
of the parties would abide by the settlement agreement and 
its non-confidentiality clause. Shefs entitled to that. 
That confidentiality clause was the reason we entered into 
the settlement agreement. That's the cornerstone of it. 
It would not have happened without the confidentiality 
clause. It simply would not have been a settled case. 
The Court is well aware of the public policy in 
favor of settling disputes, resolving differences. And 
that's what we did. And when that involves a 
confidentiality provision as detailed and as carefully 
prepared as this one, it is — when a party breaches that, 
they are — they need to answer for it. 
Your Honor, in summary, let me just say, we've 
got two causes of action left: breach of contract and the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The 
complaint is pleaded properly. The allegations in the 
complaint are deemed to be true. The allegations in the 
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complaint support the causes of action stated in the 
complaint. And Ms. Mackey is entitled to proceed on this 
case, on these two causes of action, because there have 
been material breaches of both the contract and there have 
been violations of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. And I would submit it respectfully. Thank 
you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, we've just spent a half an 
hour listening to Mr. Hoole's exposition of what he thinks 
the purpose of the settlement agreement was, none of which 
is in his complaint. The single question before the Court 
today is whether Mr. Hoole has stated a complaint upon 
which relief can be granted. His complaint does not allege 
what the express purpose of the settlement agreement was 
and that the confidentiality agreement was negotiated for 
weeks. All of that is wrong. This confidentiality 
agreement was an afterthought, as they always are, and took 
very little time of the parties. 
The confidentiality agreement is not before the 
Court and has substantial other details to it. And this 
Court simply can't decide this case on the basis of 
Mr. Hoole's testimony that his client wouldn't have signed 
this agreement but for the confidentiality agreement. That 
is the problem with not having the contract before the Court. 
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Another problem with not having the contract 
before the Court is that Mr. Cannon never signed this 
settlement agreement. He never signed the confidentiality 
agreement. He is a beneficiary of this settlement 
agreement, but he never signed it. Nevertheless, he has 
never violated the terms of the confidentiality agreement, 
and Mr. Hoole has not stated a cause of action that he has. 
At the bottom line, this case is all about the 
fact that Crelley Mackey didn't get any money out of Chris 
Cannon the first time around, and now she's looking for any 
excuse she can to try to get some more money out of Chris 
Cannon and that she is unhappy by the fact that the 
contract permitted Mr. Cannon to tell the press that he 
didn't pay any money to Ms. Mackey. And that's the bottom 
line on this lawsuit. So let's back up to the allegations 
of the lawsuit and what the settlement agreement says with 
respect to confidentiality and see if it states a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. 
Now, Mr. Hoole is entitled, at the motion to 
dismiss stage, to the Court accepting as true the well-pled 
factual allegations of his complaint. He's not entitled to 
the Court accepting as true everything he's said for the 
last half hour, nor is he entitled to the truth of the 
legal allegations he's made. All he is entitled to is the 
truth of the factual allegations he's made. And we submit 
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that Your Honor can look at the terms of the 
confidentiality agreement that are in the complaint and the 
allegations, the factual allegations, of the so-called 
breach and see that it didn't happen, even if Mr. Cannon 
had signed the confidentiality agreement. 
This is what the confidentiality agreement says, 
and all that it says: "The parties agree that the factual 
and legal allegations relating to their claims and disputes 
arising prior to the date of this settlement agreement 
shall be confidential and that they shall not disclose to 
any third party that confidential information.11 That is a 
definition. The parties are defining confidential 
information limited to the factual and legal allegations 
relating to their claims and disputes. 
And I submit, Your Honor, it is so clear that 
that has not been breached, because Your Honor sits here in 
complete ignorance of what the factual and legal 
allegations were that gave rise to this settlement 
agreement. You have no idea what it was that Ms. Mackey 
alleged happened, you have no idea of what it was 
Mr. Cannon alleged or happened, or their legal theories. 
That is not in the Tribune article, that is nowhere set 
forth in the complaint that has been filed here, and the 
information which is defined as confidential in this 
complaint is still confidential. Nobody has a clue. 
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Mr. Hoole has conceded this morning — which he 
didn't concede at our last argument — that we did comply 
with the settlement agreement with respect to notifying him 
before we told the media that Mr. Cannon or his entities 
did not pay any money. So that part of the complaint is 
put to rest. So the question is simply limited to whether 
any of the allegations of the complaint constitute a breach 
of the obligation not to disclose factual and legal 
allegations. 
Now, Mr. Hoole wants to stand up here and say 
that means Mr. Cannon was never entitled to give his 
opinion on anything after this dispute was settled. That's 
not what the agreement says. And confidentiality 
agreements, because they are restraints on speech, have to 
be strictly construed and particularly in the context of a 
congressman who is protected by the speech and debate 
clause of the Constitution. And Mr. Cannon's comments were 
prompted by the media hysteria surrounding the fact that he 
was on the Judiciary Committee, Clinton was coming before 
the Judiciary Committee as a possible grounds — for 
possible impeachment, and the media hysteria knew that 
there had been allegations of sexual harassment made 
against Mr. Cannon's office, because of all of the articles 
which we have already attached to Your Honor — to the 
responses here and that Your Honor has seen. 
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The limitation on the parties to this agreement 
was not to talk about the factual legal allegations 
relating to their claims and disputes arising prior to the 
date of this settlement. Now, did that happen? What does 
the complaint allege? 
Well, the complaint alleges that Mr. Cannon said 
a number of particular things. It says that Crelley Mackey 
has the ability to waive confidentiality. There's nothing 
that keeps Mr. Cannon from expressing his opinion on that 
fact. He may be right on that; he may be wrong on that, 
but the plain fact of the matter is that is not a factual 
and legal allegation relating to claims and disputes 
arising prior to the date of this settlement. If it's 
anything, it's the dispute arising after the date of the 
settlement with respect to the interpretation of the 
settlement agreement. But that is not an express breach of 
this confidentiality agreement. 
That they are not holding her to confidentiality. 
Once again, that is Mr. Cannon's opinion, and he is free to 
express his opinion. There is nothing in the settlement 
agreement that does anything but keep him from talking 
about the factual and legal allegations relating to the 
claims and disputes arising prior to the date of the 
agreement. 
That although she is free to discuss it, there 
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would be no benefit for her to talk about it publicly. 
2 I Once again, that reflects his opinion regarding matters 
3 arising after the date of the settlement agreement. 
4 That there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's 
part. That was never part of the factual and legal 
6 I allegations relating to the claims and defenses of the 
7 | parties. The one reason why we've put all those newspaper 
articles in there is because Ms. Mackey herself says in 
those articles there were no claims of impropriety against 
Mr. Cannon. So that was not one of the claims or defenses 
of the parties or their factual disputes. Everybody agreed 
on that, and that can't be confidential information. 
That no hostile environment existed in 
Mr. Cannon's office. Once again, this is Mr. Cannon's 
opinion and, furthermore, once again, that is something 
Ms. Mackey said before this — before the — not this 
lawsuit but the earlier dispute was even made. She said it 
was a little minor something between two consenting adults. 
So that is not part of the factual and legal allegations 
relating to the disputes of the parties. 
That there was never anything to Ms. Mackey's 
allegations. Once again, that's Mr. Cannon's opinion and 
it doesn't reveal what was expressly defined as 
confidential information in this agreement, which is the 
legal or factual allegations relating to their claims and 
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disputes. 
That Ms. Mackey's allegations had no merit. 
Again, Mr. Cannon is not disclosing the factual 
allegations — factual and legal allegations relating to 
the claims and disputes. He is simply expressing his 
opinions. 
That her allegations would not have held up. 
Once again, this is simply an expression of his opinion 
after the settlement and, again, it doesn't reveal the 
legal or factual allegations relating to the claims and the 
disputes. 
Now, frankly, I don't know why Ms. Mackey wants 
to bring this lawsuit, because, if this lawsuit proceeds, 
then we're going to have to talk about what the factual and 
legal allegations relating to the claims and disputes were. 
And, frankly, they're not very pretty. That's my opinion. 
But Your Honor doesn't know them, the press doesn't know 
them, the public doesn't know them, because Mr. Cannon did 
not breach the express terms of the confidentiality 
agreement. And restraints on speech, confidentiality 
agreements are always interpreted narrowly. 
If Mr. Hoole, if it really had been Mr. Hoole's 
intention, if it really had been critical, if, as he said 
this morning, the centerpiece of this settlement was that 
nobody would ever, ever express an opinion about it again, 
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1 that's not what he got in the terms of this settlement 
2 agreement. He got a very narrow confidentiality agreement, 
3 that the factual and legal allegations relating to people's 
4 J claims and defenses would be kept confidential. And they 
have been confidential, 
6 I And by looking at the terms of the complaint and 
7 his allegations of how it was breached, this Court can 
8 determine as a matter of law that it hasn't been breached, 
9 because there is nothing that he alleges that constitutes 
confidential information as defined by the settlement 
agreement, which is the factual and legal allegations 
relating to the claims and disputes. 
Now, Mr. Hoole seems to be arguing — and we 
attached his letter to Mr. Cannon before Mr. Cannon had his 
town meeting on Pres. Clinton's impeachment. He seems to 
be alleging that Mr. Cannon has to call — has to call him 
ID 
17 | every time he's going to open his mouth. And that simply 
is not what is required under the terms of this settlement 
agreement. 
Moreover, he seems to be alleging that once 
something is public knowledge, it is still subject to the 
confidentiality agreement. By definition, this agreement 
was designed to protect certain limited confidential 
information, the factual and legal allegations relating to 
the parties claims and disputes. If that information is 
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not in the public domain and someone puts it in the public 
domain then, obviously, there's a breach. But if it's 
already out there somehow, then it's not, by definition, 
confidential information. And Mr. Cannon, in his role as a 
congressman, can't be restrained under First Amendment, 
under the speech and the debate clause, by a broad 
interpretation of a confidentiality agreement that he 
didn't even sign but he has abided by. 
Now, you know, Mr. Hoole has made all kinds of 
strawman arguments here. We never asserted that Utah 
doesn't acknowledge the covenant of — the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. I've taught contracts for 
22 years in this state, and we would never make the 
assertion that the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is not part of the common law of the state of Utah. 
What we did say is that it doesn't broaden 
express contract rights, which is what Mr. Hoole has argued 
for here today. He's saying we can take this language, 
this language that says that the parties will keep factual 
and legal allegations related to their claims and disputes 
arising prior to the date of the settlement agreement 
confidential and that we can expand that and say that that 
means that Mr. Cannon can never give his opinion, or that 
he cannot give his opinion about things that arise after, 
or that he has to call Roger Hoole every time he wants to 
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1 hold a town meeting on whether Pres. Clinton can be 
2 impeached, simply because that also happens to involve 
3 allegations of sexual harassment. 
4 Now, Ms. Mackey got the consideration she 
5 bargained for. Nobody in this room has any idea what the— 
5 what the factual and legal allegations relating to the 
7 parties' claims and disputes were. Your Honor, I know, 
sits there in complete ignorance because those have never 
9 I been made public. And there is nothing in this narrow 
confidentiality agreement that restrains Mr. Cannon's 
ability to give his opinion after the fact and to comment 
on things. And if it were, it would be unconstitutional. 
Your Honor, we submit that this case has to be 
dismissed because there is — has been no claim stated. 
THE COURT: Counsel, let's look at this agreement 
a minute. I've read it and I've read it and I've read it 
and I've heard you read it. 
MS. WOOD: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: "The parties agree that the factual 
and legal allegations relating to their claims or disputes 
arising prior to the date of this settlement agreement 
shall be confidential." 
MS. WOOD: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Now, t h a t ' s what you ' re saying and 
t h a t ' s what I read t h a t t h a t says t h a t anything t h a t took 
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place, as far as the underlying facts and situation cannot 
2 be disclosed. 
3 MS. WOOD: Right. 
4 THE COURT: And they shall not disclose to any 
5 third party that confidential information. 
6 J MS. WOOD: Right. 
THE COURT: Now, it goes on. "The terms of the 
settlement or the amount of the payment made under the 
settlement agreement, except..." Now, it says there, as I 
interpret that, they cannot disclose any terms of the 
settlement agreement except as follows. 
MS. WOOD: Right. That's the way I read it too. 
THE COURT: And then, of course, it says their 
attorneys, their tax, so forth. 
MS. WOOD: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Then it says "Disclose on Monday, 
February 9th that Ms. Mackey's claims have been resolved to 
the parties' satisfaction." That can be stated. 
MS. WOOD: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: "Thereafter, if pressured by the 
media, after first speaking with Roger Hoole..." 
MS. WOOD: And that happened. 
THE COURT: "...that Ms. Mackey's claims have 
been resolved upon satisfaction by settlement, without any 
admission of liability or payment of money to Chris 
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Mackey — Chris Cannon or the use of tax dollars." And, of 
course, that's all — I guess was done. 
MS. WOOD: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Then it goes on. "Thereafter, if 
further pressured by the media and asked specifically 
whether the Cannon entities have contributed money to the 
settlement, Mr. Cannon may respond, after speaking with 
Roger Hoole, that no entities or campaign contributed to 
any settlement, other than as specifically allowed herein." 
Now, my question to you is: Is that second 
sentence, "the term of the settlement or the amount of the 
payment except as," broad enough to prevent him from 
disclosing or discussing or talking about the settlement 
agreement? 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, I don't think — it's 
obvious that it couldn't keep him from saying there was a 
settlement agreement, because that was public. And he has 
not disclosed any of the terms of the settlement agreement. 
The only terms of the settlement agreement that are before 
Your Honor are the provisions of the confidentiality 
agreement. 
Your Honor is completely ignorant of the terms of 
the settlement agreement. And he hasn't talked about the 
terms of the settlement agreement. He has talked about his 
opinions. I think it is very important, Your Honor, to 
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1 keep reading, because it says, "Other than as specifically 
2 allowed herein, the parties and their attorneys shall not 
3 volunteer any confidential information." It takes it back 
4 to the definition of confidential information. And 
5 confidential information is the factual and legal 
6 allegations relating to the claims and disputes. That's 
what the confidential information was supposed to be. 
And, I agree, they were not supposed to disclose 
9 I the terms of the settlement agreement, other than 
permitting them to say that there would be no — that there 
were no payments made by Mr. Cannon and his entities. 
THE COURT: But did Mr. Cannon discuss the terms 
of the settlement agreement as far as discussing the 
settlement agreement itself? 
MS. WOOD: Your Honor, that is not alleged in the 
complaint. It is not alleged in the complaint that he 
revealed the terms of the settlement agreement. And we 
have to deal with what's in the allegations of the 
complaint. And I walked through every one of the 
allegations in the complaint. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. WOOD: He expressed his opinions. He said he 
wouldn't hold her to confidentiality. And he won't. 
THE COURT: Does the settlement agreement — is 
the confidentiality agreement broad enough to limit him in 
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expressing his opinion on the settlement agreement? 
MS. WOOD: No. It doesn't say that, Your Honor, 
and that's where I — that's where I say that 
confidentiality agreements, restraints on speech, 
particularly when you're dealing with a congressman who's 
subject to the speech and debate clause, have to be 
construed narrowly. 
And there is nothing here that prohibits him from 
expressing his opinion about the settlement agreement or 
anything that happened arising after — I mean, other than 
the — arising after the date of the settlement. And, you 
know, this is nothing more than just another calculated 
attempt to try to hit Mr. Cannon up and embarrass him 
because he's a congressman and because he didn't pay her 
any money. 
We submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thanks, Counsel. 
MR. HOOLE: Your Honor, I can assure you that 
this is not something that was created by Ms. Mackey. This 
matter had been placed to rest and had not been discussed 
or in the media for many months. Before Mr. Cannon went in 
to the press, this was absolutely what she did not want. 
She did not want this to come up again, and it has come up 
again, in violation of the agreement• 
THE COURT: Now, Counsel, let me ask you about 
102 
that. I know you have the right to contract and to bargain 
for what you want. But what has Mr. Cannon said that 
discloses anything of damage to the plaintiff in this case? 
MR. HOOLE: Well — 
THE COURT: And — wait a minute. Wait a minute. 
And I know, if it says in the confidentiality agreement you 
can't talk about it at all, that that is a contract of 
that. But does it go that broad and has he said anything 
that actually results in damage to her — 
MR. HOOLE: Oh, he — 
THE COURT: — other than what has — that is 
already known? 
MR. HOOLE: Well, Your Honor, I don't know what 
else he said to the Tribune, because the Tribune has filed 
a motion to ask the Court to quash my subpoena for a copy 
of the tape recording of this interview. So I don't know 
what else was said. We have listed what we know was said. 
And I just must explain that these are covered by the 
settlement agreement. And if I could do that very briefly. 
Mr. Cannon says that Ms. Mackey has the ability 
to waive confidentiality. Well, the settlement agreement 
itself says she doesn't. So he's commenting on the 
settlement agreement. 
THE COURT: And you're saying that any comment 
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1 that he makes, even as far as the confidentiality 
2 agreement, anything at all as far as the settlement 
3 agreement, is in violation of the agreement, 
4 MR. HOOLE: I'm saying anything he says, other 
5 than what is specifically scripted out and put between 
6 ] quote marks in the confidentiality provision was 
7 | prohibited, including the several statements he's made, 
8 I because they directly contravene the settlement agreement 
g and they are exposures of the terms of the agreement and 
violate the non-confidentiality provision. 
For example, he says Ms. Mackey has the ability 
to waive confidentiality. Under the settlement agreement, 
she does not. So he's stating his opinion, his legal 
conclusion of whether or not she can talk. And she cannot 
talk. 
THE COURT: But how does that have anything to do 
with the confidentiality agreement? 
MR. HOOLE: Because it was a term of the 
settlement agreement. A term of the settlement agreement 
was that nobody would talk about it other than as 
specifically set forth. And he says she can. He's 
commenting on it. He is mischaracterizing the settlement 
agreement and forcing it into a dialogue. 
He says also that they are not holding her to 
confidentiality. The settlement agreement holds her to 
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confidentiality. 
He says that she is free to discuss it and there 
would be no benefit for her to talk about it, suggesting 
that it will only hurt her if she talks. Well, Your Honor, 
we had factual disputes and legal controversies which were 
settled. And for him to come back now and say that, you 
know, she can talk about those, but she won't because it 
will only hurt her, is clearly in violation of the 
settlement agreement. And it hurts her immensely to have 
that published in the newspapers. It hurts her immensely. 
Mr. Cannon says there was no impropriety on his 
part. That was a subject of the settlement. There was 
impropriety on his part, according to Ms. Mackey, and that 
was one of the things that was resolved. That was one of 
the legal disputes and factual allegations that was 
resolved. 
He says that there was no hostile environment in 
his office. Well, that was one of the disputes that was 
settled. He says that there was nothing to her 
allegations. Well, we agreed that we would render the 
allegations moot, that neither side would admit them or 
concede them. 
That allegation, that legal dispute was put to 
rest by the settlement agreement, and now he's saying that 
there was nothing to it. That is all fairly encompassed 
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within the confidentiality provision and our lawsuit. 
He says that her allegations have no merit. 
Again, he's commenting on the disputes that were laid to 
rest. He says that her allegations would not have held up. 
He's commenting on the facts and controversies that were 
put in — that were made moot by the settlement agreement. 
He wants the settlement agreement, he's a party to the 
settlement agreement. 
Counsel will not tell you that he's not a party 
to it. She has filed a motion saying that one of our 
original claims, which was tortious interference with 
contract, was not well-stated because he was a party to the 
agreement. It so happens that Steve Taggert signed on his 
behalf, and that was agreed to. But he's a party to the 
agreement even though he may not have signed it. And 
Counsel's dealing with a legal technicality that is a red 
herring. He's a party to the agreement. He wants the 
benefit of this, but he also wants to be able to talk, and 
he can't talk about it. That's what we're saying. He 
can't talk about this. He agreed not to. 
And they're dancing on these legal 
technicalities, this head-of-the-pin routine, Your Honor. 
It's just that. It's just that. We agreed what would be 
said and under what circumstances, and we agreed that 
nothing else would be said. The only thing that could be 
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said at the stage that Mr. Cannon talked to the Tribune 
was, quote, "No comment,11 close quote. That's where we 
were. This is not an attempt by her to make a lot of money 
because she's mad about the settlement agreement. She's 
not mad about the result of the settlement agreement. She 
entered into it voluntarily. But an integral part of it 
was the confidentiality provision. He has breached that. 
THE COURT: You're saying that he breached the 
terms of the confidentiality by giving the terms of the 
settlement agreement; is that right? 
MR. HOOLE: I didn't understand the question. 
THE COURT: You're saying that he breached the 
confidentiality agreement by giving the terms of the 
settlement agreement? 
MR. HOOLE: In part, yes. Yes. He has said that 
she's not bound by confidentiality. She is. The 
settlement agreement says she is. He's saying the 
settlement agreement does not bind her. It does. He's 
commenting on the settlement agreement and the disputes 
that were laid to rest. 
Your Honor, I wrote him the letter — I wrote 
Counsel the letter — not Mr. Cannon. I wrote his counsel 
a letter before a town meeting because we had heard that he 
was going to talk again about Crelley Mackey. And I just 
reminded them in the letter that he can't do that. 
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Fortunately, nobody asked him any questions. 
THE COURT: Doesn't that get awful narrow as to 
whether he can have an opinion as to whether she's bound by 
confidentiality or not? 
MR. HOOLE: He can have all the opinions in the 
world, Your Honor, and so can she, and so can the other 
parties to this agreement. They all have their opinions. 
But they can't express them any more. We've agreed that we 
wouldn't do that. 
Now, Counsel makes a big deal out of the fact 
that we have not attached a copy of the settlement 
agreement to this. And our reason for that is there are 
other parties involved. And we cannot attach it other than 
by order of this Court. And, Your Honor, we have done only 
what is minimally required to try and stop this and get 
Mr. Cannon's attention and pursue claims for his vicious 
violation of this agreement. 
Your Honor, this is serious to my client. This 
is not a joking matter, as it might be to others. This is 
very serious. 
THE COURT: Well, when you say very serious, how 
is she damaged by this? 
MR. HOOLE: Well, she's in counseling — she's 
been in counseling for it. 
And I would appreciate it if Counsel would not 
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snicker at everything I say. 
MS. WOOD: I apologize, Your Honor. I was not 
snickering, but I — I don't mean to be rude. 
MR. HOOLE: She's in counseling. It's been 
devastating. It's in the press. She has family members 
who don't want to talk to her. 
THE COURT: But was that as a result of the 
original dispute or was that a result of this so-called 
breach of the confidentiality agreement? 
MR. HOOLE: She was in counseling before. She 
had problems because of all the newspaper articles. It was 
a difficult thing for her before, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you saying that this has 
escalated it? 
MR. HOOLE: She has damages. We've alleged 
damages in our complaint. We're entitled to have those 
allegations deemed true and accepted by the Court. Yes, 
I'm saying that. 
THE COURT: Are you limited by the terms of this 
settlement agreement? I believe there was a limitation of 
$10,000 or something, wasn't there? 
MR. HOOLE: No, Your Honor. We don't believe 
that that liquidated damages clause is binding. It's not 
something that we've — we've briefed to the Court. I 
imagine that that will come up as Counsel files another 
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motion. 
THE COURT: Well, that's probably not relevant 
today. I probably shouldn't even have brought it up, so... 
MR. HOOLE: I don't believe it is relevant today, 
Your Honor. Our client is damaged. And it's not just a 
matter of what legal damages she's entitled to. She needs 
to stop this. 
We've bargained in good faith. We've done 
nothing wrong. This matter was put to rest for months 
before Mr. Cannon went in. And I'd like to call the 
Court's attention to one other provision in the settlement 
agreement. It says — well, the Court's read it. I won't 
do that. It says what it says. 
To the extent that there is a dispute over what 
it means, the Court is entitled to consider whether or not 
my client has properly pleaded the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing which entitles her to the benefit of 
her bargain. It's a reasonableness test. It's an 
objective test. It's a jury question as to whether or not 
there's been a violation of that implied covenant. She's 
not asking any more than the contract provides her, but 
they have such a tortured definition of what the contract 
provides, and talking about legislative privileges when 
he's talking to a news organization, not in the well of the 
Senate or in Congress, but walks in to the Tribune? That 
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doesn't apply. These are red-herring arguments, Your 
Honor. 
She's entitled to — she's entitled to stop this 
and pursue her case. And there may come a time when the 
Court will require us by court order to provide the Court-
hopefully, in camera — a copy of the settlement agreement, 
I have no objection to that if that's the Court's order. 
But I can represent to the Court that the matters which 
have been discussed by Mr. Cannon were the matters put to 
rest by the settlement agreement, and he did so in 
violation of the agreement. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
Well, of course, I've read your material. I've 
read it before and I've heard your arguments. And I want 
to look at it again. I want to think about it. I realize 
that the motion to dismiss is a harsh decision sometimes 
but, again, if it's well taken, I have the obligation to 
grant it and I want to re-read it again myself. And I'll 
call you in the next couple of days. 
MS. WOOD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. HOOLE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.) 
-000O000-
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(Teilephone conference in chambers.) 
THE CLERK: Okay. I think we've got everybody. 
Are we there, counsel? 
MS. WOOD: Mary Anne Wood is here. 
MR. O'BRIEN: Michael O'Brien here. 
MR. HOOLE: Roger Hoole is here. 
THE COURT: This is Judge Wilkinson. Let me let 
you know that we are on the record, the conversation is 
being taken down and you're placed on speaker. 
I'm calling to give you my decision in this case 
of Crelley Mackey versus Chris Cannon. First of all, 
Mr. Hoole has filed a motion to open up the record and 
supplement the record with the — 
(Telephone disconnected.) 
MR. HOOLE: Roger Hoole. 
MS. WOOD: This is Mary Anne. I can hear you. 
MR. O'BRIEN: Same here. Mike O'Brien. 
THE COURT: Okay. As I indicated to you, we are 
on the record and I'm calling to give you my decision in 
the case of Crelley Mackey versus Chris Cannon. 
The first issue is that Mr. Hoole has filed a 
motion to supplement the record and allow me to go into the 
settlement agreement. This has been opposed by 
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1 Mr. O'Brien. But even without that opposition, I don't 
2 think I need to have the record to make a decision and I 
3 don't really desire to get into the settlement agreement 
4 J anyway. Therefore, I'm going to deny the motion to open up 
the record or supplement it with the settlement agreement. 
6 I Now, I've gone over the memorandums again and 
7 looked at this. And I'm looking right now at the 
memorandum filed by Mr. Hoole in opposition to defendant's 
g motion to dismiss. And on page 4, he lists eight areas in 
which he thinks that the settlement agreement has been 
breached. I've gone over and I've marked the first five of 
those that — where I find that there has been some 
reference in the Tribune article to what he says here. 
And, of course, the first two have to do with 
confidentiality. And, yes, he did say that Crelley Mackey 
has the ability to waive confidentiality and that they are 
not holding her to it. 
However, I do not think that this amounts to a 
breach of the settlement agreement. I think he merely 
stated a fact that the settlement agreement is 
confidential, but as far as he's concerned, Mrs. Mackey can 
breach that or say what she wants to. I don't think that 
that amounts to a breach of it. 
And No. C is also very similar to that, that 
she's free to discuss it as she sees fit. And, again, I 
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think this goes to the fact that both parties are bound by 
it but that Mr. Cannon, as far as he's concerned, she may 
discuss it as she sees fit. 
The next two, D and E, get a little more close to 
it, where he says there's no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's 
part and there's no hostile environment. He does make 
statements to that effect as far as the Tribune article is 
concerned. But, again, I would find that these are not 
breaches of the agreement. I think that the exceptions to 
the confidentiality are broad enough to cover a mere 
statement that there's no impropriety or that the hostile 
environment did not exist. I don't think it is 
disparaging. I don't think it breaks the intent of the 
confidentiality agreement in any way. 
The last three is that there was nothing to 
Mrs. Mackey's allegations, that Mrs. Mackey's allegation 
had no merit and the allegations wouldn't have held up. 
I don't find in the Tribune article or the 
Deseret News article that Mr. Cannon really gets into that 
subject. 
Therefore, what I'm saying, as far as these eight 
are concerned — and, of course, Mr. Hoole also says that 
these do not include everything — but I do not find, as 
far as these eight are concerned, that there's been a 
breach of the confidentiality agreement. 
114 
Now, the agreement — also, the exception, of 
course, says that they are to contact Mr. Hoole before 
discussing this. I think the record showed that he was 
contacted before the Deseret News article came out. And 
I'm not sure that the contact there would not be broad 
enough to apply to — to a discussion with the Tribune 
reporter. In fact, I'm finding that he did not talk to 
them — to Mr. Hoole before talking to the Tribune, but I 
think that there was no damage done. I think that he had 
been contacted earlier and it was probably broad enough. 
What I am saying is that I'm finding in favor of 
the defendants and against the plaintiff. I find that 
there has not been any breach of the contract of 
confidentiality, the settlement agreement, and also the 
other issue that there has not been a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Of course, I want 
to make it straight, there were some statements made there 
that Utah does not recognize this. And I never said that 
and I always maintain that that was a cause of action. But 
I do not feel it's been breached in this case. 
Any questions? 
MR. HOOLE: Your Honor — 
THE COURT: Please state your name. 
MR. HOOLE: — so the Court's ruling that 
nobody — 
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THE COURT: Please state your name. 
MR. HOOLE: Excuse me. This is Roger Hoole. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOOLE: Is it the Court's ruling that nobody 
that was a party to the settlement agreement is bound by a 
confidentiality clause? 
THE COURT: No, that is not the agreement. I 
think all parties are bound by the confidentiality clause. 
But I think either party, Crelley Mackey or Mr. Cannon, 
could say, "As far as I'm concerned, they can talk about 
it. I don't care if they breach the confidentiality. It 
doesn't matter to me." 
But, yes, I find that they are bound by it and it 
is in there. 
Any other questions? 
MR. HOOLE: Your Honor, you mentioned before we 
were cut off the first time — again, this is Roger Hoole— 
that this ruling's on the record? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HOOLE: Okay. 
THE COURT: Any other questions? If not, then 
I'd ask Ms. Wood if you would please prepare an order. 
MS. WOOD: I will, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
MS. WOOD: Thank you. 
116 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. HOOLE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. O'BRIEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MS. WOOD: Bye-bye. 
MR. HOOLE: Bye-bye. 
THE COURT: Goodbye. 
(Whereupon, the conference was concluded.) 
-oooOooo-
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' " ° ^STRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 1 I 1999 
tnAKE COUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CRELLEY MACKEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRIS CANNON, Individually, 
THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN 
CHRIS CANNON, CHRIS CANNON FOR 
CONGRESS, INC., CANNON 
INDUSTRIES, INC., THE CI GROUP, and 
CANNON ENGINEERING 
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE 
RECORD 
Civil No. -980903903-
Judge Homer J. Wilkinson 
This matter came for hearing on December 10, 1998 on Defendants' motion to 
dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. Plaintiff was represented by Roger H. Hoole and 
Heather E. Morrison. Defendants were represented by Mary Anne Q. Wood and 
Sheri A. Mower. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda of the parties and after hearing 
argument of counsel, took the matter under advisement. Subsequent to the hearing, Plaintiff 
filed a motion to supplement the record. On December 15, 1998, the Court convened a 
conference call with all counsel of record present. Roger Hoole was present on behalf of 
Plaintiff. Defendants were represented by Mary Anne Q. Wood and The Kearns Tribune 
Corporation was represented by Michael Patrick O'Brien. The Court announced its ruling on 
the record. 
The Court denied Plaintiffs motion to supplement the record for the reason that 
the Court did not need to read the entire settlement agreement in order to consider the motion 
to dismiss. Paragraph 14 of Plaintiff s Amended Complaint includes Plaintiffs allegations of 
the statements by Mr. Cannon that Plaintiff claims constituted breaches of the settlement 
agreement. The Court, having considered each allegation, A through H, in turn and having 
compared these allegations to the language of the settlement agreement as set forth in 
Paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint, finds that none of the alleged statements constitute a 
breach of the settlement agreement. 
The Court further found that Mr. Cannon did not breach the settlement 
agreement by failing to notify Roger Hoole prior to speaking to the Salt Lake Tribune since he 
had previously notified Mr. Hoole prior to speaking with the Deseret News. This fact was 
undisputed by Mr. Hoole in the hearing. 
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the above referenced matter is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
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correct copy of the foregoing Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint 
and Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement the Record was mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Roger H. Hoole, Esq. 
Heather E. Morrison, Esq. 
HOOLE & KING, L.C. 
4276 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Michael Patrick O'Brien, Esq. 
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